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International Trade with Indirect Additivity†
By Paolo Bertoletti, Federico Etro, and Ina Simonovska*
We develop a general equilibrium model of trade that features “indi-
rectly additive” preferences and heterogeneous firms. Monopolistic 
competition generates markups that are increasing in firm produc-
tivity and in destination country  per capita income, but indepen-
dent from destination population, as documented empirically. The 
gains from trade liberalization are lower than in models based on 
CES preferences, and the difference is governed by the average 
 pass-through. When we calibrate the model so as to match observed 
 pricing-to-market in  micro-data, it generates welfare gains that are 
substantially lower than those predicted by  commonly employed 
frameworks. (JEL D24, D43, F12, L13)
Gains from  intra-industry trade derive largely from the consumption of new and cheaper imported varieties (Broda and Weinstein 2006). These gains have been 
the focus of international trade theory under monopolistic competition at least since 
Krugman (1980) and the subsequent large literature based on CES preferences. 
Summarizing this literature, Arkolakis, Costinot, and RodrÍguez-Clare (2012)—
henceforth, ACR—have shown that: (i) the gains from trade liberalization can be 
simply captured by a formula featuring only the change in the domestic expendi-
ture share and a “trade elasticity,” namely the elasticity of the relative imports with 
respect to variable trade costs; and (ii) for heterogeneous firm models à la Melitz 
(2003) and Chaney (2008) with a Pareto distribution of productivity, the trade 
elasticity depends only on the shape parameter of the distribution. Arkolakis et al. 
(2015)—henceforth, ACDR—have proved that when demands feature a choke price 
and there are no fixed costs, the same welfare formula applies to some prominent 
examples of homothetic preferences and have shown that the welfare gains from 
trade are only marginally different under  non-homothetic directly additive prefer-
ences, à la Krugman (1979). These surprising results appear to suggest that not only 
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the supply side dimension, but also consumer preferences, play a limited role in 
shaping the gains from trade.
In this paper, we introduce in the literature on  multi-country trade with heteroge-
neous firms a class of preferences that generates variable demand elasticities across 
firms (encompassing models with isoelastic, linear, and other direct demand func-
tions), and we show that it is crucial in shaping pricing and trade patterns as well as 
the gains from trade. We aim to quantify these effects and to this end we test a spe-
cific functional form. Our preferences are indirectly additive (IA), which means that 
they are represented by an indirect utility, which is additive in prices (Houthakker 
1960). This class includes CES preferences as the only case in common with the 
classes of directly additive and homothetic preferences. In addition, it contains an 
entire family of  well-behaved,  non-homothetic preferences with the unique property 
that the demand function of each good has an elasticity that depends on its own 
price and on income, but not on other prices, and can be described empirically by 
a standard multinomial logit model.1 Our assumptions on the supply side are stan-
dard. Each variety is produced by a firm after paying an entry cost with productivity 
drawn from a known distribution. Monopolistic competition reigns.
We initially analyze the equilibrium in autarky for general IA preferences and 
cost distributions. Firms adopt markups that can be variable in firms’ marginal costs 
(incomplete  pass-through) and in the income of consumers (pricing to market), but 
that are always independent of the size of the market. Therefore, opening up to 
costless trade induces gains from variety that are qualitatively à la Krugman (1980). 
However, except for the CES case, the equilibrium is inefficient: too many goods 
are consumed (relative to the mass of created goods) and  low-cost firms produce 
too little. In the case of costly trade between identical countries, trade liberalization 
induces selection effects à la Melitz (2003) as long as production involves fixed 
costs. Moreover, the model generates incomplete  pass-through of  trade-cost reduc-
tions on the prices of imported goods and no impact on domestic prices, which 
limits the gains from trade liberalization.
To make headway in a  multi-country framework with costly trade, we abstract 
from fixed production costs as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and ACDR, and 
we adopt a Pareto distribution of productivity, which sets our model in the general 
gravity framework of ACR and Allen, Arkolakis, and Takahashi (2014). The model 
predicts that firms extract higher  markups from richer destinations, but that they 
do not set different  markups in countries of different population size. These pre-
dictions are in line with the empirical results obtained by Simonovska (2015) from 
 cross-country price data of identical products sold via the Internet. In particular, 
controlling for the cost to deliver products to a destination, the author finds that 
a typical  monopolistically competitive apparel producer charges higher prices for 
identical goods in richer destinations, but does not find evidence that prices vary 
with the population size of the market. Dingel (2017) obtains similar results using 
1 Bertoletti and Etro (2017) consider trade under IA only between two countries and with identical firms. 
Among recent general equilibrium trade models with  non-homothetic preferences and heterogeneous producers see 
Fieler (2011), Behrens et al. (2014), Feenstra and Romalis (2014), Simonovska (2015), and ACDR inter alia. For a 
recent general equilibrium dynamic model with  non-homothetic preferences see Etro (2016). 
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data on unit values for individual US producers across many destinations. Notice that 
traditional models of monopolistic competition cannot account for prices increasing 
in destination income when they are based on quasilinear preferences (Melitz and 
Ottaviano 2008) or homothetic preferences (Feenstra 2014), and generate prices 
that are decreasing in destination population when they are based on directly addi-
tive or homothetic preferences (for instance, see Behrens et al. 2014, Simonovska 
2015, and ACDR).
The model generates further  firm-level predictions that are consistent with data. 
First, more productive firms enjoy higher  markups, in line with the evidence in De 
Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Second, when trade costs are large, exporters are 
more productive and represent a minority of the active firms, as documented in 
Bernard et al. (2003), yet they may sell tiny amounts per export market, as docu-
mented in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). New implications emerge for the 
margins of trade. The extensive margin is increasing in destination  per capita income, 
neutral in destination population (as is natural without fixed costs),2 and falling in 
the trade cost to the destination. Hence, the model predicts that the extensive margin 
is falling in the distance to the destination and potentially rising in overall GDP of 
the destination country (the product of  per capita income and population), which is 
in line with Bernard et al. (2007). Finally, the intensive margin of trade is increasing 
in a destination’s overall GDP and decreasing in the destination’s  per capita income, 
which is in line with exploratory findings by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) 
for several exporting countries across their export destinations.
As in Melitz (2003) and ACR, trade liberalization reallocates production across 
exporting and  non-exporting firms and across countries. The two key differences 
are that reductions in trade costs are only partially shifted into lower prices due to 
incomplete  pass-through, and that consumers purchase new foreign goods but keep 
buying the same domestic goods at the same prices, though in smaller quantities. We 
obtain a global quantitative measure of the welfare gains from trade liberalization 
that differs from the formula derived for CES (ACR) and other homothetic prefer-
ences (ACDR). In particular, the gains from trade are reduced by a coefficient that 
corresponds to the  sales-weighted average  pass-through, which in our model is also 
one minus the  sales-weighted average elasticity of price with respect to income. 
When demand is very elastic, a high  pass-through generates high gains from trade 
liberalization because lower trade costs are largely shifted into lower prices of 
imports (without consequences on the domestic prices), and these are exploited by 
consumers purchasing new imported varieties. In contrast, when demand is rather 
inelastic,  pass-through is low and the welfare gains are limited. Notice that any 
model based on CES preferences, as in Melitz (2003) and ACR, produces complete 
 pass-through for all firms. As shown by ACDR, a similar effect also arises in models 
based on other homothetic preferences, since two effects of trade liberalization bal-
ance each other out: on the one hand, inframarginal exporting firms tend to increase 
2 However, directly additive or homothetic preferences imply that the extensive margin is decreasing in the 
population of the importing country (see ACDR). 
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their markups due to incomplete  pass-through, and on the other hand, a selection 
effect on the set of domestic firms tends to reduce the markups of all firms.3
To obtain further predictions and to quantify the welfare gains from trade liberal-
ization, we introduce a specification of preferences that generates demand functions 
nesting the special cases of perfectly elastic, linear, and perfectly inelastic demands. 
This yields closed form solutions for  firm-level and aggregate variables as well as for 
the welfare gains, and delivers additional predictions in line with the data. First, trade 
liberalization increases sales more for smaller firms, as documented by Eaton et al. 
(2008) and Arkolakis (2016). Together with the fact that trade liberalization induces 
new entry of foreign varieties, this implies that adjustments on the extensive margin 
are critical in understanding the welfare gains from trade (Broda and Weinstein 2006; 
Kehoe and Ruhl 2013). Second, the degree of cost  pass-through is falling in firm 
productivity, as documented by Berman et al. (2014). This implies that larger firms 
change prices less with changes in costs and more with changes in income, and it is 
precisely this behavior that directly impacts the welfare gains.
Since we parameterize firm productivity to be unbounded Pareto, the model 
shares an identical loglinear gravity equation of trade with the models examined in 
ACR and ACDR, where the Pareto shape parameter governs the trade elasticity. To 
quantify the differences in welfare gains predicted by the two classes of models, we 
let the trade elasticity take on the value of five in line with ACR, ACDR, and esti-
mates in Caliendo and Parro (2015), and we calibrate the preference parameter that 
governs the degree of  pricing-to-market and  pass-through to match the average elas-
ticity of price with respect to income as reported from micro data by Simonovska 
(2015). We find that the gains from any trade liberalization experiment are about 
30 percent lower than the gains reported by ACR for homothetic models. Hence, the 
mismeasurement of welfare due to ignoring incomplete  pass-through is both quanti-
tatively and economically large, which leads us to conclude that the demand side is 
crucial in understanding the welfare gains from trade.4
We proceed as follows. In Section I, we present the baseline setting of our model. 
In Section II, we study trade between heterogenous countries. In Section III, we 
quantify the mismeasurement of welfare gains from trade. We conclude in Section IV.
I. Framework
Consider a market populated by  L identical agents, each one with labor endow-
ment  e . Firms can produce a variety from a set  Ω at a constant marginal cost after 
paying a sunk entry cost  F e > 0 . Upon entry, the “intrinsic” marginal cost  c of each 
firm is independently and identically drawn from a distribution  G(c ) with support [0,  _ c] for a large, and possibly infinite,  _ c > 0 . For tractability, we neglect fixed costs 
3 ACDR obtain marginally smaller gains for directly additive  non-homothetic preferences because the selection 
effect only partially countervails the incomplete  pass-through effect. 
4 In the Appendix we also identify the model’s parameters by matching  well-documented  firm-level moments in 
the literature, which provides even lower gains from trade liberalization. With increasing availability of firm- and 
 product-level data, it would be of interest to estimate preference parameters from these data and test another unique 
prediction of this model, which relates the demand elasticity for a good on the good’s own price and consumer 
income, but not on other prices. 
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of production (as in Melitz and Ottaviano 2008 and ACDR). All costs are in (effi-
ciency) units of labor and the labor market is perfectly competitive. In this section 
we normalize the wage to unity so that  c is marginal cost and, given zero expected 
profits, per capita income  E just equals the individual labor endowment.
The indirect utility of each agent depends (exploiting homogeneity of degree 
zero) on the normalized prices  s(ω) = p(ω) / E , for  ω ∈ Ω , according to the follow-
ing additive specification:
(1)  V =  ∫ Ω 
 
 v(s(ω)) dω,  
where  v is a decreasing and convex function up to a (possibly infinite) choke 
value  a , so that  aE is the maximum willingness to pay for each variety, with 
 v(s) =  v ′ (s) = 0 for all  s ≥ a . With the exception of CES preferences that it encom-
passes (with an infinite choke price), (1) represents a class of preferences that are 
neither homothetic nor directly additive (see Bertoletti and Etro 2017). An import-
ant property of these preferences for empirical purposes is that a market demand 
system can be described by the multinomial logit model with income effects if and 
only if the representative consumer is endowed with indirectly additive preferences 
(Thisse and Ushchev 2016). By Roy’s identity, the individual demand for each vari-
ety  ω that is actually consumed is given by
(2)  x(ω)  =  v′(s(ω)) ______μ ,  
where  μ =  ∫ Ω 
  v′(s(ω)) s(ω) dω = − E (∂ V / ∂ E) depends on all prices and  ∂ V / ∂ E is 
the marginal utility of income. Accordingly, demand faced by a producer of variety 
ω is decreasing in its own price  p(ω) and vanishes if this is above the choke level:
(3)  p ˆ = aE,  
which depends linearly on income.5
A. Autarkic Equilibrium
Let  N be the measure of firms paying the entry cost: we analyze monopolistic 
competition among a measure  n ≤ N of active firms producing different varieties 
for a given distribution of costs. The profits of a firm with marginal cost  c choosing 
a price  p(c) can then be written as
(4)  π(c) =  ( p(c) − c )v′ ( 
p(c) ___E ) L  _______________μ ,  
5 The dependence of the choke price on income alone is a key property of IA. In other models based on homo-
thetic or directly additive preferences, the choke price depends on the marginal utility of income, i.e., on the price 
distribution and on the measure of consumed varieties (see Feenstra 2014, and ACDR). In the quasilinear model 
of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the marginal utility of income is fixed at unity, but the choke price depends on the 
number of varieties and on their average price. 
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where  μ is unaffected by a single firm. The demand function (2) has a price elasticity, 
which is just the elasticity of  v′(s) , namely  θ(s) ≡ − sv″(s ) ____
v′(s ) , which is  variable across 
firms, as is the income elasticity of demand, which can be computed as  θ(s) −  ∂ ln |μ|  _____∂ ln E .6 
The  profit-maximizing pricing rule is
(5)  p(c) = c ( θ (p(c) / E)   __________ θ (p(c) / E) − 1) ,  
for any  c > 0 . To satisfy the conditions for the existence of a  well-defined opti-
mal price  p(c) , we assume that  θ (s) > 1 and that the  second-order condition 
 2θ(s)  >  ζ(s) is satisfied for all  s ∈ (b, a ) , where  b ≡ p(0)/ E and 
 ζ(s) ≡ − v‴(s)s/v″(s) is a measure of demand curvature (see Bertoletti and Etro 
2017). Notice that the optimal markup of each firm,  m(c) = ( p(c)  − c)/c , is inde-
pendent from the number of goods available and from the price of any other firm.
Let us actually assume  θ′(s)  ≥ 0 ,7 which is equivalent to what Mrázová and Neary 
(2013) define as “subconvexity” of the demand function, and it is sometimes called 
“Marshall’s Second Law of Demand.” When demand elasticity is strictly increas-
ing, the model has four main implications for pricing across firms. First, prices are 
lower but markups are higher for more productive firms, which differs from the 
Melitz (2003) model. Second, markups increase with the income of consumers and 
differently across firms: these effects are absent in any model based on homothetic 
preferences (Melitz 2003; Feenstra 2014) or quasilinear preferences (Melitz and 
Ottaviano 2008). Third, and differently from models based on directly additive pref-
erences (Behrens et al. 2014, Bertoletti and Epifani 2014, and Simonovska 2015), 
markups are independent from market size  L . Fourth, it is easy to verify that the 
elasticities of prices with respect to income and marginal cost sum to one:
(6)  ϵ E (c) ≡  ∂ ln p(c) _______∂ ln E =  
θ (s (c) ) + 1 − ζ (s (c) )   _______________
2θ (s (c) ) − ζ (s (c) )  = 1 −  
∂ ln p(c) _______∂ ln c 
  ≡ 1 −  ϵ c (c)  ∈  (0, 1) ,  
which shows the inverse relation between pricing to market and  pass-through.8
The individual consumption of the variety produced by a  c -firm is 
 x(c) = v′( p(c)/E)/μ , which is zero if its price (given by (5)) if above the choke 
level  p ˆ . The equilibrium set of active firms is simply given by the interval  [0,  c ˆ] , 
6 The tight connection between price and income elasticities is of course due to the additivity of preferences: 
see Houthakker (1960). 
7 This implies  θ ′ s / θ = θ + 1 − ζ ≥ 0 . See Bertoletti and Etro (2017) for an exploration of the case in which 
θ ′ < 0 and there are fixed costs. 
8 Notice that  θ ′ > 0 implies also that the elasticity of demand with respect to income is higher for smaller firms 
with higher prices. However, by augmenting the model to endogenous quality as in Bertoletti and Etro (2017), we 
can obtain that more productive firms sell higher quality goods with higher prices and larger income elasticities. See 
Caron, Fally, and Markusen (2014) on the role of income elasticities in trade. 
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where the marginal cost cutoff  c ˆ = aE is just the choke price.9 The model is closed 
equating the expected gross profits
  피 {π(c)} =  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ  ( p(c) − c)v′( p(c)/E ) L  ________________ μ  dG(c) 
to the entry cost  F e . Since  μ = N  ∫ 0 aE v′(s(c))s(c) dG(c) , this gives
(7)  N =  EL ___ θ ̅ F e   with  
_ θ ≡  [ ∫ 0 
 c ˆ  1 ________ θ( p(c)/E )  
p(c) x(c)  _____________   ∫ 
0
  c ˆ p(c) x(c) dG(c)  dG(c)] 
−1
 ,  
where  θ ̅ is the harmonic average of demand elasticities weighted by the market 
shares. In particular, notice that the equilibrium distribution of normalized prices 
F s (s) has support  [b, a] and is given by
  F s (s)  =  Pr   
 { p(c) ≤ sE; c ≤  c ˆ} =  Pr   
 {c ≤ h(s)E; c ≤ aE} =  G (h(s )E)  ________
G (aE)  , 
where  h(s) = s [1 − 1/θ (s) ] ( h′ > 0 ). This allows us to express the average demand 
elasticity as
(8)  _ θ =  [ ∫ b 
a  1 ____ θ(s)  
sv′(s) ___________   ∫ 
b
 a sv′(s) d F s (s)
 d F s (s)] 
−1
 ,  
which is independent from market size (but can depend on income). Accordingly, 
the measure of consumed varieties  n = NG( c ˆ) must be linear in population. Two 
simple examples are in order.
Isoelastic Demand.—The familiar case of CES preferences should clarify the 
nature of the equilibrium. Consider  v(s) =  s 1−θ , where  θ ∈ (1, ∞) governs the 
constant demand elasticity. The Roy’s identity delivers the isoelastic demand 
x(ω) = (θ − 1) s  (ω) −θ / |μ| , or10
  x (ω) =  p  (ω) −θ E __________   ∫ Ω   p  (ω) 1−θ dω . 
As well known, there is no finite choke price, the equilibrium prices are 
p(c) =  θc ___ θ − 1 since  θ ̅= θ , and  pass-through is complete. Therefore, the number of 
goods created is  N =  EL ___θ F e  and all these goods are produced and consumed (since we 
have abstracted from fixed costs of production).
9 This assumes that the constraint  c ˆ ≤  _ c never binds. 
10 The indirect utility can be expressed (up to a monotonic transformation) as  V = E  [ ∫ Ω 
  p  (ω) 1−θ dω] 1/(θ−1) . 
8 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2018
Linear Demand.—Consider now a new example with  v(s) =  (a − s) 2 / 2 . The 
Roy’s identity (2) delivers the linear demand function  x(ω) = (a − s(ω))/ |μ| , or
  x(ω) =  aE − p (ω)   __________________  ∫ Ω   (aE − p(ω))( p(ω)/ E ) dω . 
It is immediate to derive a familiar expression for the monopolistic price
  p(c) =  c + aE _____
2
 , 
which is increasing less than proportionally in the marginal cost and in income, 
but is independent from the number of goods and population. Demand elasticity 
 θ(s) =  s ___ a − s ∈ (1, ∞) is increasing in the  price-income ratio. The profits of an 
active firm with  c ≤  c ˆ = aE are then given by  π(c) =   ( c ˆ − c) 2 L ______
4E |μ|  . Further results can 
be obtained by assuming (as in Chaney 2008, and the subsequent literature) that the 
cost distribution corresponds to a productivity distribution that is Pareto (unbounded 
above), namely  G(c)  =  (c / _ c) κ with  _ c > 0 finite and  κ > 1 as the shape parameter.
We can then compute  피 {π(c)} =  L  c ˆκ+2 ______________ 
2 (κ + 1)  (κ + 2) E |μ|  _ cκ and  |μ| =  N  c ˆ
κ+2  _________  
2 (κ + 2)  E 2  _ cκ . 
Accordingly, we obtain  피 {π(c)} = EL / [ (κ + 1) N] and thus, under free entry,
  N =  EL _______ (κ + 1 ) F e , 
which implies  θ ̅= κ + 1 .11 Since the choke price is finite only a fraction  G(aE ) of 
the  N firms that entered the market are active in this case.
Turning to the empirical literature, as discussed in detail in the introduction, the 
distinct prediction of IA preferences—the neutrality of population on prices—finds 
empirical support in markets of monopolistic competition with a large number of 
firms, see Simonovska (2015) and Dingel (2017). In addition, the model’s prediction 
is in line with empirical findings by Handbury and Weinstein (2015) for US cities; 
identifying varieties with barcode data, and controlling for all retail heterogeneity 
and purchasers’ characteristics, the authors provide convincing evidence that larger 
cities do not feature different prices of individual varieties, but have more varieties 
available, which yields lower price indices there. Using the same data source, Broda, 
Leibtag, and Weinstein (2009) document also that richer consumers pay more for 
identical products even after controlling for average income in the zip code in which 
they live, where the latter aims to capture local costs to operate the store. In con-
trast, there is a literature that links productivity, prices, and  markups to city size. For 
example, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) find that retail establishments are larger 
in larger US cities, which suggests that  markups should be decreasing with firm 
entry. Similarly, Hottman (2014) finds that retailers’  markups vary with the size of 
11   θ ̅can be obtained directly also by using the equilibrium distribution  F s =  ( 2s − a ____a ) 
κ to compute (8). 
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US cities. Both papers argue that these observations indicate that the retail sector is 
oligopolistic, rather than being monopolistically competitive.12
With respect to the theoretical literature, a negative equilibrium relationship 
between market size and prices emerges in existing ( non-CES) models of monopo-
listic competition (see Melitz and Ottaviano 2008 and ACDR), and is often regarded 
as a  pro-competitive effect. However, this relationship is not due to a strengthening 
of competition on the supply side, since strategic interactions are absent from these 
models. The mechanism is driven by equilibrium changes in the substitutability 
between products on the demand side, whose nature and direction cannot be easily 
verified empirically. While we consider the neutrality of population on prices an 
attractive feature of our monopolistic competition setting, competition effects could 
be easily introduced by adding demand externalities or strategic interactions.
B. Welfare and Trade among Identical Countries
The effect of an expansion of the market size under IA replicates a key prop-
erty of the Krugman (1980) model, for which a larger population (whose impact is 
equivalent to opening up to costless trade with identical countries) increases pro-
portionally the number of firms/varieties created in equilibrium without affecting 
markups (which is not the case under direct additivity; see, for instance, Dhingra 
and Morrow 2012). Since the range of created goods that are actually consumed and 
their prices are independent from population, this generates pure gains from variety. 
To see this, notice that welfare can be computed as follows:
(9)  V = n  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ v ( p(c) ____E )  dG(c) _____G( c ˆ) . 
This is linear in the measure of consumed varieties  n = G( c ˆ)N , which in turn is 
linear in the population size. Therefore, costless trade leads to welfare gains that are 
due only to an increase of the mass of consumed varieties for any IA preferences 
and cost distribution.
With the notable exception of CES preferences, our setting implies an inefficient 
market allocation. To verify this, in Appendix A we solve the social planner problem 
for the maximization of utility under the resource constraint.13 The optimal alloca-
tion delivers the following measure of firms:
(10)   N ∗ =  EL _______ ( η ̅ + 1) F e  with  η ̅ ≡  ∫ 0  c ˆ
∗  η (s(c))  v(s(c))  _____________   ∫ 
0
  c ˆ∗  v (s(c)) dG(c)  dG(c) ,  
12 It is well known that markets with a small number of firms would exhibit equilibrium markups decreasing in 
the size of the market due to strategic interactions (which depend on the number of competitors). For recent trade 
models with strategic interactions see Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Etro (2015). One could explicitly introduce 
an oligopolistic retail sector into our model and derive new pricing predictions, but such extension is beyond the 
scope of the present paper. 
13 Dhingra and Morrow (2012) and Nocco, Ottaviano, and Salto (2014) have analyzed optimality with hetero-
geneous firms in the cases of direct additivity of preferences and of quasilinearity, respectively (without fixed costs, 
in the latter case). In the case of homogeneous firms, the characterization of the social planner problem for any 
symmetric preferences was first derived in Bertoletti and Etro (2016). 
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where  η ̅ > 0 is a weighted average of the subutility elasticity  η(s) = − v′(s)s/v(s) > 0 , with relative utilities as weights, and it is again independent 
from  L . This allows for equilibrium entry either above or below optimum ( _ θ should 
be compared to  η ̅ + 1 ). More importantly, the social planner sets a constant mark up 
m ∗ = 1/  η ̅, as needed to equalize the marginal rate of substitution between any two 
produced goods to their marginal cost ratio:
(11)  p ∗ (c) =  (1 +  1 __ η ̅) c. 
Finally, the optimal marginal cost cutoff is smaller than the equilibrium one (when 
they are finite): 
(12)  c ˆ∗ =  aE η ̅ ____
1 +  η ̅ <  c ˆ. 
It follows that the equilibrium prices must be above optimal for the most efficient 
firms and below optimal for the most inefficient firms.14 Therefore, a redistribution 
of production from high-cost toward low-cost firms would indeed improve the allo-
cation of resources.
To gain further insights, our two examples are again useful. With CES prefer-
ences  η ̅ = θ − 1 and the equilibrium is optimal (see Dhingra and Morrow 2012). 
With any other IA preference relation with a finite choke price, if the cost distribu-
tion corresponds to a productivity distribution that is Pareto, we obtain that  η ̅ = κ (see Appendix A). This result reveals an interesting property shared by our ear-
lier example with linear demand and its generalization presented in Section IIC: in 
equilibrium, the number of firms is optimal. Nevertheless, a pervasive inefficiency 
remains: too many goods are consumed relative to the mass of firms created, and 
 low-cost firms produce too little while  high-cost firms produce too much.
Our framework can be easily extended to trade frictions between identical coun-
tries for any IA preferences, which indeed include the CES case of Melitz (2003). 
First, notice that identical countries must have the same wage and the same value of 
μ . Second, given an iceberg transport cost  τ > 1 , the pricing rules are the same as 
before, with  p(c) given by (5) for domestic sales and  p(τc) for foreign sales, both 
independent from the market size. However, as long as  θ′ > 0 , each exporting firm 
applies a lower markup on exports compared to the markup on domestic sales.15 
As long as there are positive fixed costs of production, such a model delivers an 
equilibrium partition of firms between exporters and  non-exporters and selection 
effects of trade liberalization à la Melitz.16 Most importantly, a reduction of the 
14 In fact,  p ∗ (0 )  = 0 ≤ p(0 ) and  p ∗ (  c ˆ∗ ) =  c ˆ > p(  c ˆ∗ ) , with  p ∗ ′ (c) > 1 > p′(c) under the assumption that 
θ′ > 0 . 
15 If varieties differ endogenously in qualities one can show that more efficient exporters can sell abroad better 
products with higher markups (see Bertoletti and Etro 2017). The existing empirical literature points in this direc-
tion: see Bastos and Silva (2010), Manova and Zhang (2012), Martin (2012), and Dingel (2017). 
16 Assume that production in each market requires a fixed cost  F ≥ 0 . The net profits from domestic sales are 
π(c )  − F and those from exports are  π(τc )  − F , where  π(c ) is always given by (4). The cutoff cost for domestic 
sales is  c ˆ =  π −1 (F ) , and the cutoff for the marginal exporting firm is  c ˆx =  c ˆ/ τ . The  free-entry condition:
 ∫ 
0
  c ˆ [π(c)  − F] dG(c )  +  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ/τ [π(τc )  − F] dG(c )  =  F e 
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trade cost  τ increases the markups of the previously imported goods due to incom-
plete  pass-through, but does not affect the markups of the inframarginal domestic 
goods. As a consequence, trade liberalization induces a redistribution of production 
from  high-cost  non-exporting firms toward  low-cost exporters, but it also increases 
the average markup of inframarginal firms, which tends to limit the welfare gains. 
The next section develops a  fully fledged multicountry model with the purpose of 
quantifying those gains.
II. Trade among Heterogeneous Countries
We now consider costly trade between countries that are heterogeneous in pop-
ulation,  per capita labor endowment and trade costs. The “iceberg” cost of export-
ing from country  i (source) to country  j (destination) is  τ ij ≥ 1 , with  τ ii = 1 for 
i, j = 1, … , I where  I ≥ 2 is the number of countries. Country  i has  N i firms paying 
the entry cost  F e , population  L i , wage  w i , marginal costs  τ ij  w i c for the destination 
country  j and  per capita labor endowment  e i , so zero expected profits imply that 
individual income is  E i =  w i  e i . We assume that preferences exhibit a finite choke 
price  a , that  θ′ > 0 (to obtain pricing to market and incomplete  pass-through), and 
that the cost distribution (that corresponds to a Pareto distribution of productivities) 
is given by  G(c) =  (c / _ c) κ , where  κ > 1, is the shape parameter, and  _ c is finite (but 
large enough to be never binding).
The profit that a  c -firm from country  i makes by selling to country  j is
(13)  π ij (c) =  
 ( p ij (c)  −  τ ij  w i c) v′ (  p ij (c ) ____ E j  )  L j    ____________________  μ j  , 
where  | μ j | is as usual the marginal utility of income (times per capita income) of 
country  j . Maximizing these profits delivers the price rule:
(14)  p ij (c)  =  τ ij  w i c ( 
θ (  p ij (c)/ E j )   ____________ θ ( p ij (c)/ E j ) − 1) . 
As noticed earlier, this predicts that prices and markups are higher in countries 
that enjoy higher  per capita income levels, but independent of their population size. 
Moreover, since the markup in expression (14) is falling in the firm’s intrinsic cost of 
production,  c , the model predicts that more productive firms enjoy higher markups, 
which is in line with wide evidence, for instance, with observations in Slovenian 
data documented by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Once again, the elasticities 
ϵ ij E (c) ≡ ∂ ln  p ij / ∂ ln  E j and  ϵ ij c (c) ≡ ∂ ln  p ij / ∂ ln c add to  1 .
closes the model. As long as  F > 0 , one can easily obtain by total differentiation that  ∂ c ˆ/ ∂ τ > 0 . The intuition is 
simple: lower trade costs increase the expected profits of exporting firms at the expense of  non-exporters, which 
implies that the domestic  cut-off firm must now be more efficient (for a similar result with directly additive prefer-
ences see Bertoletti and Epifani 2014). 
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The individual quantity sold by a  c -firm of country  i to destination  j is 
given by  x ij (c) =  v ′ ( p ij (c)/ E j ) / μ j . The value of the corresponding sales 
 t ij (c) =  p ij (c)  x ij (c)  L j is
  t ij (c) =  
 p ij (c)v′ (  p ij (c ) ____ E j  )  L j   ____________ μ j  . 
The most inefficient firm in country  i that is actually able to serve country  j has the 
marginal cost cutoff
(15)  c ˆij =  a E j  ____ τ ij  w i  ,  
(remember that  v′(a) = 0 ), which simplifies to  c ˆii = a e i for the domestic sales in 
country  i . Therefore, in our model the range of the firms active domestically is wider 
in the country with higher individual labor endowment, and depends neither on the 
population size (since there are no fixed costs) nor on the trade costs. Instead, the 
set of exporters enlarges with the per capita income of the importing country, and 
shrinks with the bilateral trade cost and the exporter’s wage. A key consequence 
is that trade liberalization does not affect the range of the firms active at home but 
just enlarges the set of exporters, and therefore the measure of imported varieties. 
However, like in other models (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008, ACR, and ACDR), pro-
duction is reallocated across firms toward exporters and across countries. If trade 
costs are sufficiently high, exporters are more productive than  non-exporters, repre-
sent a minority of the active firms as documented by Bernard et al. (2003), and they 
may sell tiny amounts per export market (the marginal exporter has zero sales), as 
documented in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011).
Defining  n j C ≡  ∑ i=1 I  n ij to be the measure of goods consumed in country  j , we 
have
  μ j =  ∑ 
i=1
I
  n ij  ∫ 0  c ˆij  v ′ ( s ij (c))  s ij (c)  dG(c) _____G ( c ˆij ) =  n j C  ∫ b 
a v′(s)s d F s (s) , 
where  F s (s) is the equilibrium distribution of normalized prices. This distribution 
has support  [b, a] , is identical across countries, and is independent from incomes 
and trade costs:
  F s (s) =  Pr   
 {c ≤ h(s)   c ˆij  __a ; c ≤  c ˆij } =  ( h(s) ____a ) 
κ
 , 
where  h(s) = s [1 − 1 / θ (s) ] . The neutrality of the distribution of normalized prices 
as well as of markups from trade costs is due to the fact that liberalization reduces the 
prices of inframarginal exporting firms and increases their markups (due to incom-
plete  pass-through), but it also attracts the entry of new exporters with higher prices 
(and smaller markups), and these effects exactly balance each other out. However, 
trade liberalization does not affect domestic pricing; therefore the average markup 
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across all inframarginal firms (domestic and exporting) must increase. Finally, it is 
immediate to verify that the distribution of individual consumption is affected by 
any change in  μ i and, in particular, by changes in trade costs.17
Taking the expectations of sales and profits, we obtain the ratio
(16)  피 { π ij }  ______피 { t ij }  =  
1 __  θ ,  
where the constant  
_ θ is the equilibrium harmonic average of demand elasticity 
defined in (8), which under the Pareto distribution is identical across countries.18 
Under endogenous entry, total expected profits  피 { Π i } =  ∑ j=1 I 피 { π ij } in country  i 
must equate the fixed cost of entry  w i  F e . Let us define total (expected) sales from 
country  i , as  Y i =  ∑ j=1 I  T ij , where  T ij =  N i 피 { t ij } are the (expected) sales in country 
j that originated from country  i . The endogenous entry condition reads as
  피 { Π i } =  w i  F e , 
and the income/spending equality for country  i implies  w i  e i  L i =  Y i , where 
 Y i =  ∑ j  T ji is GDP in country  i . Therefore, we can derive the number of firms cre-
ated in country  i as
(17)  N i =   w i  e i  L i  ___________  ∑ j=1 I 피 { t ij } =  
 e i  L i  ____ F e   
 ∑ j=1 I 피 { π ij }   ___________ ∑ j=1 I 피 { t ij }  =  
 e i  L i  ____  θ  F e ,  
which is the same as in autarky. Accordingly, trade does not affect the measure of 
firms created nor that of domestic firms active in each country.
A. Trade Margins and General Equilibrium
We can now derive the measure of firms actually exporting to any country  j from 
country  i ,  n ij =  N i G(  c ̂ij ) , the  so-called extensive margin of trade, as
(18)  n ij =  N i  (  c ˆij  __ _ c ) 
κ
 . 
This depends negatively on the trade cost and positively on  per capita income of 
the destination country through  c ˆij , and on the “aggregate labor supply”  e i  L i of the 
exporting country through  N i , but it is independent from the population size of the 
destination country. Hence, the model predicts that the extensive margin is falling 
in the distance to the destination (to the extent that trade costs are increasing in dis-
tance) and potentially rising in overall GDP of the destination country (which is the 
17 This is just the opposite of models based on directly additive preferences with a finite choke price, where 
changes in trade costs are neutral on the distribution of individual consumption and modify the distribution of 
prices. 
18 Our setting satisfies the Assumptions R1 and R2 of ACR (see their page 102). 
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product of  per capita income and population), as reported in Bernard et al. (2007). A 
positive relationship between destination population size and the extensive margin 
can be restored by the introduction of fixed costs à la Melitz (2003).19
The evidence on the relationship between the extensive margin and population 
size is mixed. Authors who use internet data (e.g., Macedoni 2015)20 find that 
the extensive margin is neutral in population size as predicted by the baseline IA 
model. In contrast, authors who use traditional trade data, such as  firm-level or 
 product-category-level manufacturing data (e.g., Macedoni 2015 when using the 
Exporter Dynamics Database or Hummels and Klenow 2005 when using disaggre-
gate bilateral  trade-flow trade), find that the extensive margin is increasing in pop-
ulation size and the coefficient estimates vary across countries and industries. This 
suggests that there is heterogeneity in fixed costs across countries and industries, 
ranging from nearly zero in online markets to positive and potentially large costs in 
traditional retail markets.
An implication of our model is that the extensive margin is increasing as the 
importing country gets richer, which is in line with the growth in the measure of 
imported varieties documented by Broda and Weinstein (2006) for the United 
States over three decades. The authors document that during the period  1972–2001, 
the number of imported varieties in the United States has increased by a factor of 
three. They also note that half of the rise can be attributed to new products sold 
by existing trade partners. We should remark that contrary to the predictions of 
the IA framework, models based on directly additive or homothetic preferences 
(without fixed costs of production, as in ACDR) imply that the extensive mar-
gin is decreasing in the population of the destination country, and it is neutral 
(increasing) with respect to income under homotheticity (direct additivity), while 
the  Melitz-Chaney model (with fixed costs expensed in source country wages) 
generates an extensive margin that is increasing in both destination income and 
population.
The total measure of varieties consumed in country  j can be expressed as follows:
(19)  n j C =   ∑ i=1 
I  e i  L i  c ˆ ij κ  _________  θ  _ cκ  F e  ,  
which crucially depends on  j ’s  per capita income and on its trade costs (through 
 c ˆij ), and on the labor force of its trading partners. It follows that countries that are 
richer in per capita income terms (and larger in labor endowment) tend to consume 
more goods. This makes a remarkable difference with analogous models based on 
homothetic preferences and (untruncated) Pareto distribution (see Arkolakis et al. 
2010, and Feenstra 2014) in which the measure of consumed goods is equal across 
countries and independent of their income, population, and trade costs.
19 See footnote 33. 
20 The author collects data for Samsung and verifies the results using data for Zara, Apple, H&M, and Ikea from 
the Billion Prices Project. 
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Expected sales from country  i to country  j can be derived, by computing  피 { t ij } , 
as follows:21
  T ij =  N i 피 { t ij } =  Y j   n ij  ___ n j C  =  Y j  
 e i  L i  c ˆ ij κ _________   ∑ k=1 I  e k  L k  c ˆ kj κ =  n ij  
_ tij , 
where we decomposed trade into the product of the extensive margin and the inten-
sive margin  
_ tij . We can rewrite the latter as
(20)  _ tij =  피 { t ij }  _____G(  c ˆij ) =  
 L j  E j  ____ n j C  . 
This is independent from the country of origin of the commodities, but it depends 
on both  per capita income and population of the destination country, contrary to 
the intensive margin of the  Melitz-Chaney model, which is constant as long as the 
(fixed) costs of export are expensed in labor of the source country.22 Two direct 
effects are immediately observable: in our model, the intensive margin is increasing 
in the destination’s population size, and decreasing with respect to the destination’s 
per capita income (through the impact of  E j on  n j C ). Therefore, the model can jointly 
generate a positive relationship between the intensive margin and the overall GDP 
of a destination, and a negative relationship with the destination’s  per capita income, 
as documented for several source countries by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). 
Notice that these implications are in contrast also with comparable models without 
fixed costs of production (ACDR): directly additive and homothetic preferences 
generate an intensive margin that is always increasing in destination income.
To close the model in general equilibrium, notice that
(21)   T ij  ___ T jj =  
 Y i  ___ Y j  ( 
 w i  ___ w j ) 
− (κ+1)   τ ij −κ . 
This simple result can be interpreted as follows: the assumption of a Pareto distribu-
tion gives rise to a generalized “gravity” equation that governs the trade shares (see 
e.g., Head and Mayer 2014; and Allen, Arkolakis, and Takahashi  2014), where  κ is 
the “trade elasticity” according to the terminology suggested by ACR. In particular, 
the trade share of  i -goods in country  j is given by
(22)  λ ij =   T ij  ___ Y j =  
 n ij  ___ n j C  =  
 e i  L i  c ˆ ij κ _________   ∑ k=1 I  e k  L k  c ˆ kj κ . 
21 Accordingly, our setting also satisfies assumption R3 of ACR (see their pages  103–4). 
22 The  Melitz-Chaney model relates the intensive margin to the fixed cost to serve a destination and to the unit 
in which it is expensed. If this cost is parameterized to be source- and  destination-specific as in Eaton, Kortum, and 
Kramarz (2011), and if one assumes that the cost is systematically related to destination characteristics, the model 
can generate a systematic relationship between the intensive margin and destination characteristics. 
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Finally, using the expressions for the trade shares we can express the 
 income-spending equation of each country  i as
(23)  w i  e i  L i =  ∑ 
j=1
I
  λ ij  E j  L j . 
Using (22) and (23) provides the equilibrium wage system
(24)  w i =  ∑ 
j=1
I
   w j  e j  L j  ( τ ij  w i ) −κ   _________________  ∑ k=1 I  e k  L k  ( τ kj  w k ) −κ , i = 1, … , I,  
which is similar to those of related models satisfying the restrictions of ACR. It 
implies wage equalization only under free trade or identical countries (as in the 
previous sections). Moreover, it can be proved (Alvarez and Lucas 2007) that (24) 
has a unique solution (up to a normalization) and that the relative wage of country 
j is increasing in its aggregate labor supply  e j  L j and decreasing in its trade costs 
 τ j ′ =  [ τ 1, j , … ,  τ I, j ] .
B. Welfare and Comparison with Other Models
Utility for a consumer of country  j can be expressed as
(25)  V j =  n j C  ∫ b a v (s) d F s (s) ,  
which is the product of the total mass of consumed (domestic and imported) vari-
eties (19) and the expected utility from each good: the former depends on trade 
costs (as well as on size and income of all countries), but the latter depends only on 
preferences and the cost distribution. Accordingly, trade liberalization affects wel-
fare only through a change in the consumed varieties. More precisely, a reduction 
in trade costs reduces prices for each imported good in a less than proportional way 
due to incomplete  pass-through and it does not affect the price of any domestic good 
(because the domestic cutoff cost does not change);23 consumers exploit this by 
increasing the number of imported varieties without dropping any of the domestic 
varieties but consuming less of each. It is now clear that the higher is  pass-through 
the more new imported varieties can be purchased, which increases the gains from 
trade liberalization.24
Our final aim is to derive a global quantitative measure of these gains from trade 
liberalization as in ACR (in spite of the  non-homotheticity of our preferences). First 
of all, taking logs and differentiating (25) with respect to  τ j and  w′ =  [ w 1 , … ,  w I ] 
23 Since domestic cutoffs do not change, this implies that no domestic firms exit during trade liberalization. 
Pavcnik (2002) finds that trade liberalization in Chile leads to domestic firm exit. Recently, Hsieh et al. (2016) doc-
ument that domestic variety exit leads to significant welfare losses to Canada during the CUFTA. This mechanism 
is absent from our baseline model, but it can be restored by adding fixed market access costs to the model, albeit at 
the cost of loss of tractability in a  multi-country environment. See footnote 33. 
24 Notice that the new imported varieties allow for the final equilibrium distribution of the (normalized) prices 
and markups to remain the same, therefore welfare changes in our setting can be measured only with changes in the 
number of imported varieties. 
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for a given  E j (we can always normalize wage changes in such a way that  d ln  w j = 0 ), 
we get
(26)  d ln  V j = d ln  n j C =  − κ  ∑ i=1, i≠j 
I  n ij (d ln  τ ij + d ln  w i )   __________________________  n j C  ,  
where the last step exploits the differentiation of (19) with respect to  τ j and  w for 
a given  E j . Let us indicate the proportional change of a variable  z from  z _ to  _ z as 
 z ˆ =  _ z/ z _. Integrating (26), we obtain that the proportional utility change  V ˆ j due to 
a (possibly large) trade shock to  τ =  [ τ 1 , …,  τ I ] (and then to  w ) is equal to the 
change  n ˆ j C . In turn, through (22), the latter is simply related to the change in the 
domestic share  λ jj by  d ln  n j C = − d ln  λ jj (i.e.,  n ˆ j C =  λ ˆ jj −1 ).
Notice that, by (22) and (24), the changes in the domestic share  λ jj do not depend 
on the specific preferences. In fact, similarly to ACR, one can actually determine the 
impact of any reduction in trade costs by computing25
(27)   w ˆ i  Y i =  ∑ 
j=1
I
   λ ij  (  w ˆ i  τ ˆij ) 
−κ   _____________   ∑ k=1 I  λ kj  (  w ˆ k  τ ˆkj ) −κ  w ˆ j  Y j and  λ 
̂
jj =   (  w ˆ j  τ ˆjj ) 
−κ   _____________   ∑ k=1 I  λ kj  (  w ˆ k  τ ˆkj ) −κ . 
However, the specific preferences matter for translating these changes into a “quan-
titative” measure of the welfare gains from liberalization, which can be compared 
across models. In particular, here we want to derive the (proportional) variation of 
 per capita income in country  j ,  W ˆ j , which is “equivalent” to the welfare change  V ˆ j 
due to trade liberalization.
A suitable “money metric” is provided by the Equivalent Variation of income, 
 E V j , such that a consumer would be indifferent between the  post-shock prices 
induced by the change of trade costs and the new income level  W j =  E j + E V j 
evaluated at  pre-shock prices (see Varian 1992, Par. 10.1), with proportional varia-
tion  W ˆ j =  W j / E j . To understand how  E V j is computed, let us rewrite the equilibrium 
value of utility as
  V j ( W j ,  E j ;  F ij ) =  ∑ 
i=1
I
  N i  ∫ b E j  a W j  v ( p ___  W j ) d F ij ( p) , 
where  F ij is the unconditional distribution of prices  p ij posted by all firms of country 
i in country  j (varieties with prices above the  cut-off value  a W j are welfare irrele-
vant). By taking logs and differentiating the last expression with respect to  W j , one 
can get
  d ln  V j =  κ ___________ 1 −  ϵ ̅j E ( W j ,  E j ) d ln  W j , 
25 Notice that the present model satisfies the requirements of what Allen, Arkolakis, and Takahashi (2014) 
define as “universal gravity” and thus inherits their welfare results. 
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where  ϵ ̅j E ( W j ,  E j ) is derived in Appendix C and captures the  firm-sales-weighted 
average elasticity of price with respect to income, and it is thus related to the 
 sales-weighted average  pass-through and, ultimately, to the shape of the demand 
function. Therefore, the income variation that is equivalent to the impact of trade 
liberalization is implicitly determined by the solution of the equation:
(28)  ∫  E j   W j   κ _________ 1 −  ϵ ̅j E (t,  E j )  d ln t = − ln  λ ˆ jj . 
To understand this formula, notice that a rather inelastic demand function (low elas-
ticity with respect to price) implies that monopolistic firms set high prices and that 
prices react poorly to changes in costs and highly to changes in income ( ϵ ̅j E ( W j ,  E j ) 
is high). Accordingly, high prices generate a high marginal utility of income (and 
low  pass-through), which in turn reduces the income variation needed to match a 
given cost shock. As a consequence, low demand elasticity is associated with low 
welfare gains from trade liberalization. Instead, when the demand function becomes 
more elastic, cost reductions due to trade liberalization are shifted more into lower 
prices and the gains are higher.
We can approximate small changes in welfare defining  ϵ ̅E =  ϵ ̅j E ( E j ,  E j ) ∈ (0, 1) 
as the weighted average (with relative sales of firms as weights) of the elasticities of 
prices with respect to income, which is identical across countries. Under IA prefer-
ences, this is the complement to unity of the average  pass-through  ϵ ̅c ∈ (0, 1) . This 
allows us to derive our main (local) result:
(29)  d ln  W j =  ϵ ̅c  − d ln  λ jj  _______κ , with   ϵ ̅c = 1 −  ϵ ̅E ∈ (0, 1) ,  
which shows that the welfare gains from trade liberalization are proportional to the 
average  pass-through: intuitively, the lower the  pass-through on prices of reductions 
in trade costs, the lower must be the gains from trade liberalization.
Our result can be compared to those of a variety of traditional mod-
els. In particular, ACR have shown that a formula for the welfare gains as 
 d ln  W j = − d ln  λ jj /σ , where  σ is the “trade elasticity” of relative imports with 
respect to variable trade costs, applies to models different on the supply side but all 
based on CES preferences (as Anderson 1979, Krugman 1980, Eaton and Kortum 
2002, Melitz 2003, Chaney 2008, and others).26 Thus, estimating such a trade elas-
ticity allows one to measure the welfare gains from liberalization episodes. Notice 
that in models with homogenous firms, such as the Armington model (Anderson 
1979) and the Krugman (1980) model, the trade elasticity is related to the constant 
elasticity of substitution (namely  σ = θ − 1 in our notation): in these cases low sub-
stitutability between goods induces high imports of foreign varieties, which leads 
to high gains from trade liberalization. However, in a large class of heterogeneous 
firm models with an untruncated Pareto distribution of productivities, including the 
celebrated  Melitz-Chaney model (Melitz 2003; Chaney 2008), ACR show that the 
26 Also see the results of Atkeson and Burstein (2010). 
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trade elasticity  σ is independent from preference parameters and just related to the 
shape of the Pareto distribution (namely  σ = κ in our notation), and therefore that 
the gains from trade liberalization are neutral with respect to the underlying model 
details.27 This common result is based on the fact that all these models exhibit com-
plete  pass-through of cost reductions on prices due to CES preferences.
In a further generalization of the heterogenous firm models, ACDR confirm that 
the ACR welfare formula
(30)  d ln  W j =  − d ln  λ jj  _______κ 
also applies to some prominent examples of homothetic preference. As already 
noticed by Arkolakis, Costinot, and RodrÍgues-Clare (2010) and Feenstra (2014), 
in these cases trade liberalization induces consumers to replace the most expen-
sive domestic goods with an identical number of cheaper imported varieties, which 
excludes gains from variety associated with trade. In the terminology of ACDR, 
reductions in marginal costs due to trade liberalization are here the only source of 
gains.28 The reason is that a reduction in trade costs exerts two effects on markups 
that balance each other out as if  pass-through was full: on the one hand, inframar-
ginal exporting firms tend to increase their markups due to incomplete  pass-through, 
but on the other hand, the reduction of the choke price (which creates a selection 
effect on the set of domestic firms) tends to reduce the markups of all firms. The 
welfare formula (30) applies also globally for the simple reason that the marginal 
utility of income can be normalized to be independent from income under homo-
thetic preferences (as is the set of purchased varieties for given prices).
ACDR also consider the case of directly additive preferences. They derive the 
following local approximation (valid only for small welfare changes)
(31)  d ln  W j =  (1 −  ρ ____ κ + 1)  
− d ln  λ jj  _______κ ,  
where  ρ , a weighted average (with relative sales as weights) of the elasticity of 
markups to productivity, is positive but smaller than unity in common models with 
incomplete  pass-through. In this case, by reducing the choke price, trade liberaliza-
tion not only creates a selection effect, but it also affects the equilibrium distribution 
of prices thus increasing the measure of consumed goods (while leaving unchanged 
the distribution of individual consumption levels). As discussed by ACDR, the gains 
from the reduction of the choke price compensate only in part the losses due to 
the increase in markup on imported varieties, leading to smaller gains compared to 
homothetic preferences. However, the difference is quite limited since  (1 −  ρ ___ κ + 1 ) ∈ (  κ ___ κ + 1 , 1) when  ρ ∈  (0, 1) .
27 A similar result applies even to Ricardian models as the one by Eaton and Kortum (2002), which adopts a 
Fréchet distribution of productivities. For a recent empirical investigation of the gains from variety in this class of 
models see Hsieh et al. (2016). 
28 Bertoletti and Etro (2016) show that in homogenous firms models of monopolistic competition with free 
entry, homothetic preferences generate complete  pass-through of changes in the marginal cost and neutrality on the 
endogenous number of consumed goods. 
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Going back to our IA case, it is now clear why the gains from trade liberalization 
can be much smaller than in ACR or ACDR. A reduction in trade costs increases 
the markups of the inframarginal exporting firms due to incomplete  pass-through 
without any counteracting forces because of the absence of selection effects. 
Accordingly, the average  pass-through  ϵ ̅C ∈  (0, 1) is critical in determining the wel-
fare gains in (29). When demand is very elastic, a high  pass-through generates high 
gains from trade cost reductions (up to the ACR level in the limit case of perfectly 
elastic demand or full  pass-through). Instead, when the demand is rather inelastic, 
 pass-through is low and the gains are limited.
C. A Specific Functional Form
In the remainder of the paper and for our quantitative analysis we adopt the fol-
lowing convenient specification of IA preferences:
(32)  V =  ∫ Ω 
 
   (a − s(ω)) 1+γ   __________
1 + γ  dω. 
Here  γ ∈ (0, ∞) is the key preference parameter. By Roy’s identity, the demand for 
each variety  ω is
(33)  x(ω)  =   (a − s(ω)) γ ________  |μ|  . 
The elasticity of demand with respect to price is  θ(s)  =  γs ___ a − s , which is increasing 
in the price. Demand is actually linear (as in the example of Section II) for  γ = 1 , 
it tends to become perfectly elastic for  γ → ∞ and perfectly rigid for  γ → 0 . The 
rest of the model is the same as above. We can summarize the relevant exogenous 
variables/parameters in our setting by the objects  P ̃ =  {a, κ, γ, τ, e, L,  F e } in matrix 
notation, where  e′ =  [ e 1 , … ,  e I ] and  L′ =  [ L 1 , … ,  L I ] .
The optimal price of a  c -firm from country  i willing to sell to country  j is easily 
derived as
(34)  p ij (c)  =  γ  τ ij  w i c + a E j   __________1 + γ ,  
which shows that the degree of  pass-through is increasing in  γ . Indeed, for  γ → 0 
any reduction in costs would be exploited by the firms without price reduction (prices 
would approach the limit  a E j with full expropriation of consumer welfare), while 
for  γ → ∞ any reduction in costs would be fully translated into a price reduction 
(prices would approach the nominal marginal cost  τ ij  w i c as in perfect competition). 
The value of the sales of a  c -firm from country  i to country  j is
(35)  t ij (c) =   γ 
γ (γc +  c ˆij ) ( c ˆij − c) γ  ( τ ij  w i ) 1+γ  L j    _______________________   (1 + γ ) 1+γ  ( E j ) γ | μ j |  ,  
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while the corresponding profits are given by
(36)  π ij (c)  =   γ 
γ  ( c ˆij − c) 1+γ  ( τ ij  w i ) 1+γ  L j    __________________  (1 + γ ) 1+γ  E j γ | μ j |  ,  
and are a decreasing and convex function of  c .
Markups, Prices, and Sales.—We now derive the model’s key prediction regard-
ing markup and price variation across destinations and across firms. Denote by  m ij (c) 
 the  markup that a firm with cost draw  c from country  i enjoys in destination  j (assum-
ing that it actually serves that market, i.e.,  c ≤  c ̂ij ):
(37)  m ij (c)  =  ( 1 ____ 1 + γ) (  c 
ˆij − c
 _____c ) . 
This markup is decreasing in  γ , reflecting a more elastic demand, and rising in the 
cost cutoff  c ̂ij , reflecting pricing to market. Moreover, more productive firms set 
lower prices but enjoy higher markups.
Furthermore, from (34), the elasticity of prices with respect to the “intrinsic” 
marginal cost  c (or the transport cost  τ ij , or the wage of the source country  w i ) can 
be expressed as
(38)  ϵ ij c (c) =  γc ______ γc +  c ˆij ∈  [0,  
γ ____ 
1 + γ] . 
Similarly, the elasticity of prices with respect to income of the destination country 
E j is its complement to one:
(39)  ϵ ij E (c) =   c ˆij  ______ γc +  c ˆij ∈  [ 1 ____ 1 + γ , 1] . 
It is easy to verify that the latter is also the elasticity of prices with respect to the 
real exchange rate between the source and the destination country, which is often the 
subject of empirical investigations.29
Both the degrees of  pass-through  ϵ ij c (c) and pricing to market  ϵ ij E (c) vary with 
a firm’s productivity in a monotonic way. For instance,  pass-through is zero for 
the most efficient firms ( ϵ ij c (0) = 0 ) and the highest for the least efficient firms ( ϵ ij c (  c ˆij ) = γ / (1 + γ ) ).  Pricing-to-market in turn is as high as  1 for the most pro-
ductive firm and only  1 / (1 + γ ) for the least productive one. These differences are 
due to the fact that efficient firms set their prices low and change them mainly on the 
basis of changes in income, while inefficient firms set high prices and change them 
mainly on the basis of changes in costs. These predictions are in line with empirical 
29 It is straightforward to extend the model to feature nominal and real exchange rates (see Bertoletti, Etro, and 
Simonovska 2016). 
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evidence provided by Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) that pricing to market is 
more sensitive for more productive firms.30
Finally, let us consider the reaction of the sales of a firm of country  i toward 
country  j when the relevant trade cost decreases. We know from (38) that such a 
liberalization reduces prices  p ij (c) more for the small (high- c ) firms. As a conse-
quence, these small firms increase more their production, as could be verified by 
evaluating the elasticity of quantity  x ij (c) =  (a −  p ij (c)/ E j ) γ /  |μ| . Whether the sales 
t ij (c) of small firms are more or less reactive is not obvious. However, computing 
the elasticity  d ln  t ij (c)/ d ln  τ ij (after normalizing  d ln  w i = 0 )31 and differentiating 
it with respect to  c , we obtain
  ∂ ___ ∂ c{ ∂ ln  t ij (c) _______∂ ln  τ ij  } =  [ − γ  c ˆij  ________  ( c ˆij + γc) 2 +  γ  c 
ˆij  _______  ( c ˆij − c) 2 ]  ∂ ln  c 
ˆij  _____∂ ln  τ ij < 0, 
where  ∂ ln  c ˆij / ∂ ln  τ ij = ∂ ln  w j / ∂ ln  τ ij − 1 < 0 . Since a reduction of  τ ij corresponds 
to trade liberalization, this shows that smaller firms respond more to trade liber-
alization, which is in line with the evidence presented by Eaton et al. (2008) and 
Arkolakis (2016). Together with the fact that trade liberalization induces entry of 
foreign varieties in our model, this implies that adjustments on the extensive margin 
(changes to new and least traded varieties) are critical in understanding the welfare 
gains from trade (as argued by Broda and Weinstein 2006, and Kehoe and Ruhl 
2013).
Equilibrium Distributions.—Given our functional form, we can fully characterize 
the equilibrium in closed form (see Appendix B). The distribution of normalized 
prices on the support   [ a ___ 1 + γ , a] can be derived as
(40)  F s (s)  =  (  (1 + γ) s ______γa −  1 __γ) 
κ
 ,  
which depends only on the three parameters  γ ,  κ , and  a . Analogously, 
prices in country  j , given by expression (34), are distributed according to 
F j ( p)  =  [ (1 + γ) p / γa E j − 1 / γ] κ , which is independent from trade costs and the 
identities of the exporting countries, but depends crucially on the income of the 
importing country  j . The markup distribution can be derived as follows:
(41)  F m (m)  = 1 −  1 ___________  [1 +  (1 + γ) m] κ ,  
30 Using detailed French exporter data, these authors find that the exporter with average productivity raises 
prices by 0.8 percent when experiencing a 10 percent home currency depreciation. Furthermore, the response is 
1.3 percent for exporters with a productivity level equal to the mean plus one standard deviation, namely, for more 
productive exporters. 
31 Taking logs of  p ij and  x ij and differentiating, we get
 
∂ ln  t ij (c) _______∂ ln  τ ij  =  
∂ ln  x ij (c) ________∂ ln  τ ij  +  
∂ ln  p ij (c) ________∂ ln  τ ij  = 1 −  
∂ ln | μ j |  ______∂ ln  τ ij  +  [  c 
ˆij  ______  c ˆij + γc + γ  
c _____  c ˆij − c]  ∂ ln  c ˆij  _____∂ ln  τ ij . 
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which is also the same across countries.
The expected profit and expected sales of a firm from country  i selling in country 
j can be expressed as (see Appendix B):
  피 { π ij } =   a 
γ+1  γ γ κ  c ˆ ij κ B(κ, γ + 2 )  E j  L j    ____________________ (1 + γ ) 1+γ  _ cκ | μ j |   
and
 피 { t ij } =   a 
γ+1  γ γ+1  c ˆ ij κ B(κ + 2, γ )  E j  L j    ____________________ (1 + γ ) γ  _ cκ | μ j |  , 
where  B(z, h)  =  ∫ 0 1  t z−1  (1 − t ) h−1 dt is the Euler Beta function.32 Using its proper-
ties expression (16) yields a value for  θ ̅of
(42)  θ ̅= κ + 1,  
which is independent from the preference parameters; this implies that the return on 
sales (16) is uniquely determined by the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution. 
Moreover, it allows us to solve for the number of firms created in country  i in closed 
form as  N i =  e i  L i /[(κ + 1)  F e ] , which is the same as in autarky (both in the decen-
tralized equilibrium and in the social optimum).
The extensive margin  n ij =  N i G ( c ̂ij ) is independent from population and demand 
elasticity.33 The number of goods consumed in country  j ,  n j C (see (19)) is indepen-
dent from the preference parameter  γ , while it increases in the willingness to pay 
for each good,  a .34 Finally, we can also evaluate the market share in country  j of an 
exporting  c -firm from country  i ,  α ij (c) ≡  t ij (c)/ _ tij . This can be expressed as
(43)  α ij (c) =  
 (1 + γ  c __  c ̂ij ) (1 −  c __  c ˆij ) γ   _______________γ(1 + γ ) B(κ + 2, γ ) ,  
32 Its value is also given by
 B(z, h )  =  Γ(z) Γ(h) ________Γ(z + h) , 
where  Γ(t ) is the Euler Gamma function (see Appendix, section B). Its basic recursive properties are given by 
B(z + 1, h)  = zB(z, h)/(z + h) and  B(z, h + 1) = hB(z, h)/(z + h) . 
33 Notice that our model can generate an extensive margin that is increasing in population simply by adding 
small fixed export costs. If these are in units of local labor, say  F j , it is easy to derive from (36) the modified cutoff:
  c ̂ ij  =  
a  E j  ____ τ ij  w i  [1 −  1 + γ ____a  (  | μ j |  F j  _____ γ γ  e j  L j  ) 
 1 ___ 1+γ
 ] ,
so that the extensive margin is directly increasing in the destination population  L j . Notice that the same extension 
induces selection effects on the measure of domestic firms through the negative impact of the price aggregator  | μ i | 
on the domestic cutoff  c ̂ii , without affecting the pricing formula (34). 
34 We can also compute  | μ j | =   a γ+1  γ γ+1 B(κ + 2, γ )  ____________  (1 + γ) γ   n j C as a linear function of the number of consumed varieties. 
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and it can be verified that also the distribution of the market share is identical across 
countries and depends only on the two parameters  γ and  κ .35 This result demon-
strates an attractive feature of this framework relative to alternatives: the distribution 
of (normalized) firm sales is not uniquely tied to the distribution of firm productivi-
ties. Given a certain degree in productivity dispersion, governed by  κ , the dispersion 
in firm sales is pinned down by  γ .36 Hence, the model can potentially reconcile both 
the measured productivity and sales advantages of exporters over  non-exporters 
reported by Bernard et al. (2003).
Welfare.—Our specification of the indirect utility allows us to characterize the 
impact of trade in detail. The equilibrium value of utility in country  j is now
(44)  V j =  n j C   (aγ) 
γ+1 B (κ, γ + 2) κ  _______________  (γ + 1) γ+2  ,  
which is linear in the number of consumed goods, depends on the willingness to pay 
a , on the preference parameter  γ , which governs the level of market competitiveness/ 
pass-through, and on  κ , which governs the cost distribution.
As in the general model (see Appendix section C), we calculate the equivalent 
variation on income  E V j keeping prices unchanged at their initial level before the 
trade shock.37 Notice that the distribution  F ij of prices posted by all firms from coun-
try  i in country  j can be expressed as
(45)  F ij ( p) =  (  (1 + γ) p − a E j   __________γ  τ ij  w i _ c ) 
κ
 
on the interval  [  p _,  _ p] , where  p _ = p(0) = a E j / (γ + 1) and  _ p = p( _ c) =  (γ  τ ij  w i _ c + a E j ) / (γ + 1) . Taking logs of  V j ( W j ,  E j ;  F ij ) and differentiating with 
respect to  W j , we obtain
(46)  d ln  V j =   (γ + 1)  (κ  W j +  E j )   _____________ (γ + 1)  W j −  E j  d ln  W j . 
35 The crucial element is the distribution of  l = H (t) =  (1 + γ t)  (1 − t) γ , where  t = c /  c ˆij with 
 F t (t )  = Pr {c /  c ˆij ≤ t} =  t κ on the support  [0, 1] . Notice that  H ′ (t) < 0 and  H ″ (t) < 0 if and only if  t < 1 / 2 , 
therefore  l is distributed on  [0, 1] according to  F l (l )  = 1 −  (  H −1 (l) ) κ . 
36 Jung, Simonovska, and Weinberger (2015) demonstrate that the distributions of firm sales and productivity 
depend uniquely on the Pareto productivity shape parameter in existing models that feature consumers with directly 
additive preferences, including quadratic preferences (as in Melitz and Ottaviano 2008, but without the outside 
good) and those of Behrens et al. (2014) and Simonovska (2015). Therefore, these models cannot jointly reconcile 
moments from the two distributions observed in US data. The authors outline a flexible, albeit not tractable, exten-
sion of Simonovska (2015) that falls within the  directly-additive class and has more desirable quantitative features. 
37 The optimal prices of the varieties unsold in country  j are not uniquely defined above the cutoff price 
 a E j because demand and profits are zero. For the sake of simplicity (and to avoid any asymmetry between positive 
and negative equivalent variations), we assume that they follow the same pricing rule (34) as the varieties actually 
sold. 
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For “small” income changes (i.e., evaluating the previous differential at  W j =  E j ), 
we obtain the approximation  d ln  V j =  (γ + 1) (κ + 1) d ln  W j / γ . Recalling that 
gravity implies that  n j C =  a κ  e j κ  N j /  _ cκ λ jj , and that a shock to trade costs causes a 
proportional change of utility denoted by  d ln  V j = d ln  n j C = − d ln  λ jj , this imme-
diately delivers the local measure
(47)  d ln  W j = − γd ln  λ jj __________   (γ + 1) (κ + 1) ,  
whose coefficient is in the range  (0,  1 ___ κ + 1) for  γ ∈ (0, ∞) . Notice that the upper 
bound of this range is the lower bound of the range obtained by ACDR for directly 
additive preferences in (31). In general, the model implies gains from any liberal-
ization experiment that are approximately  
γκ ________   (γ + 1) (κ + 1) of the ACR gains in (30).
The global measure of the gains from trade liberalization,  W ˆ j , valid also for 
“large” trade shocks, can be obtained by integrating (46), which implicitly charac-
terizes  W j as follows:
(48)  ∫  E j   W j    (γ + 1)  (κt +  E j )   ___________ (γ + 1) t −  E j  d ln t = − ln  λ ˆ jj ,  
where we can further compute
  ∫  E j   W j    (γ + 1) (κt +  E j )   ___________ (γ + 1) t −  E j   dt __t =  [(γ + κ + 1) ln (γt + t −  E j ) −  (γ + 1) ln t]  E j  
 W j  . 
The approximation derived from (47) provides a lower bound for the exact wel-
fare changes in (48),38 therefore it can be used as a conservative measure of the 
benefits of trade liberalization. The welfare gains from trade liberalization depend 
on  κ , as in ACR, but also on the preference parameter  γ ∈ (0, ∞) , which governs 
 pass-through and competitiveness in the markets. Accordingly, for given values of 
the Pareto shape parameter  κ , the gains from trade liberalization are larger in more 
competitive markets with higher  pass-through (higher  γ ).39
III. Quantifying the Gains from Trade
In this section, we quantify the gains from trade predicted by the parameterized 
IA model and we compare the results to those that arise form a benchmark model 
that relies on homothetic preferences.
38 This follows from the concavity in  W j of the function on the left hand side of (48). 
39 Notice that a more competitive environment implies lower prices and higher  pass-through, which in turn 
requires a larger equivalent income variation due to the decreasing marginal utility of income. Similarly, the exact 
income variation equivalent to a positive trade shock is larger when we take into account the decreasing marginal 
utility of income. 
AQ5
26 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2018
A. Identification Strategy
In order to quantify the welfare gains from trade predicted by the model, we need 
data on trade shares (and  per capita income in the case of large trade shocks) as 
well as estimates of two key parameters,  κ and  γ . There are a number of estimation 
strategies that would allow us to identify these two parameters.
In this section, we follow a parsimonious calibration strategy, which allows us to 
identify the two parameters of interest, compute the welfare gains from trade pre-
dicted by the model, and compare them to those predicted by standard homothetic 
models of trade. The starting point is the observation that the model falls within a 
large class of models that generate a  log-linear gravity equation of trade. To derive 
the theoretical gravity equation of trade, take the log of the ratio of country  j ’s import 
share from source  i ,  λ ij in expression (22), and  j ’s domestic expenditure share, the 
corresponding expression for  λ jj , which yields
(49)  log (  λ ij  __ λ jj ) =  S ̃i −  S ̃j − κ log  τ ij ,  
where  S ̃i = log ( e i  L i  w i −κ ) for all  i = 1, … , I .
From this expression  κ can be interpreted as the partial elasticity of trade flows 
with respect to variable trade costs. Crucially, since homothetic (and  non-homothetic) 
models studied by ACR and ACDR yield an identical gravity equation of trade, if 
the parameter could be estimated using the gravity moment alone, then these models 
would have to yield identical estimates of  κ .
Estimating this parameter using the gravity equation alone is challenging and 
has been the focus of many papers—see Simonovska and Waugh (2014a,b) and 
Caliendo and Parro (2015) for recent contributions and a discussion of the related 
literature. Such a task is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, for the purposes 
of the welfare exercise, we let  κ = 5 , which is the preferred estimate of ACR and 
ACDR, and approximately the average estimate of the trade elasticity across sectors 
obtained by Caliendo and Parro (2015). Since the gains from trade in homothetic 
models are entirely driven by the value of this parameter, this choice also sets a 
useful quantitative benchmark and allows us to relate our findings closely to those 
of the existing literature.
The parameter  γ is a  demand-side parameter in our model—it governs the elastic-
ity of demand with respect to price as well as the elasticity of price with respect to 
income and the  pass-through elasticity. Consequently, the parameter is at the heart 
of the model’s pricing predictions, which are the key departure from the standard 
ACR framework.
Recall that a key testable prediction of our model relates to  cross-country price 
variation. Prices should be increasing in destination  per capita income and indepen-
dent of destination population size:  ∂ p ij / ∂ E j > 0 and  ∂ p ij / ∂ L j = 0 . In the absence 
of data on firms’ costs, the expected values of the elasticities of prices are of inter-
est so as to be able to compare them with corresponding moments in the data. In 
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 particular, we can derive an explicit expression for the average elasticity of price 
with respect to  per capita income:
(50)  피 { ϵ E } =  F 2,1 (1, κ; 1 + κ;  −γ ),  
where  F 2,1 is the hypergeometric function defined in Appendix section B. Hence, 
with a value of  κ in hand, the average elasticity of price with respect to income 
identifies  γ . Simonovska (2015) provides an estimate of this elasticity that amounts 
to 0.14. Given  κ = 5 , this estimate implies  γ = 7.62 according to equation (50). 
Armed with these parameters, we can proceed to quantify the welfare gains form 
trade.
B. Welfare Gains from Trade
How do the welfare gains from trade compare to existing frameworks? First of all, 
a comparison of our approximate formula for the welfare gains (47) and the formula 
(30) that holds for CES and homothetic preferences provides an immediate “back of 
the envelope” calculation. Given  κ = 5 and  γ = 7.62 , the IA model implies gains 
from any liberalization experiment that are approximately  
γκ ________   (γ + 1) (κ + 1) = 73.7 per-
cent of the ACR gains. Hence, the mismeasurement of welfare is quantitatively large 
(our model yields welfare gains that are almost 30 percent lower than ACR’s gains).
We make this insight more precise looking at the global formula for the wel-
fare gains (48) below. Specifically, we compute the welfare gains of moving from 
autarky to the observed trade share for each of 123 countries in year 2004 as pre-
dicted by the ACR framework for the CES model and by our IA model.40 For the 
first case, we let  κ = 5 and we use the formula (30) to arrive at the welfare measure. 
For our model, we let  κ = 5 and use the welfare measure for large shocks (48) with 
γ = 7.62 . For both models, we use the domestic expenditure shares ( 1-trade share) 
before and after the shock. In the case of the IA model, the welfare gains due to a 
global shock require values for  per capita income, and we let those correspond to the 
values before the shock. In this particular exercise, the domestic expenditure share 
goes from the observed share in the data to unity (autarky).
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the results for the ACR framework based on CES 
preferences, while the right shows the predictions of our IA model. The differences 
are significant. The average country enjoys a 14 percent welfare gain from trade 
according to the ACR framework. In contrast, our IA model yields a mean value of 
10 percent, about 70 percent of that predicted by the homothetic model. While the 
ranking of countries according to welfare gains is identical in the two models, the 
dispersion in the ACR framework is much larger than the one predicted by the IA 
model.
To further understand the difference in magnitudes that we obtain relative to 
the literature, we focus attention on the United States. ACR report that, for a US 
domestic expenditure share of 0.93 and a value for the Pareto shape parameter of 
40 We describe all data in Appendix section E. 
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 5–10, the welfare gains of moving away from autarky range from 0.7 percent to 
1.4 percent. First, we point out that in our database, for year 2004, we obtain a 
US domestic expenditure share on manufacturing, adjusted for trade imbalances, of 
0.75. Thus, we cannot directly compare the estimate for the United States reported 
in the plot above to the estimate reported in ACR. Second, let us assume that indeed 
the domestic expenditure share is 0.93 as reported in ACR and that  κ is 5. Then, 
the welfare gains from trade for the United States predicted by the ACR framework 
would amount to 1.4 percent. In contrast, the welfare gains predicted by the IA 
model would amount to 1.07 percent. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
welfare gains from trade may be substantially overestimated, should one rely on 
preferences featuring full  pass-through. It is important to remark that our findings 
also differ from those of the ACDR’s estimate of a model based on directly additive 
preferences, since they obtain a measure of welfare gains that is 96 percent of the 
value predicted by the standard ACR framework.
C. Alternative Identification Strategies and the Impact on Welfare
Given the role that  κ and  γ play in governing the welfare gains from trade in our 
model, we offer several alternative identification strategies for these two parameters 
and we discuss the impact on welfare.
First, in Appendix section D, we outline a strategy that uses commonly studied 
 firm-level moments in the international trade literature.41 In particular, we present 
the results from an overidentified estimation of  γ and  κ where we jointly target the 
following three moments: (i) the average elasticity of price with respect to income 
from Simonovska (2015) as described above, (ii) the domestic sales advantage of 
exporters over  non-exporters for the United States, and (iii) the measured produc-
tivity advantage of exporters over  non-exporters for the United States (see, e.g., 
Bernard et al. 2003). Since  κ governs the underlying dispersion in firms’  production 
41 For a good review of quantitative trade models see Kehoe, Pujolas, and Rossbach (2016). 
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Figure 1. Welfare Cost of Autarky in CES and IA Models, 123 Countries
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costs, while  γ controls the demand side of the economy, thus linking costs to equi-
librium prices and quantities, the last two moments provide additional informa-
tion regarding the value of the two parameters. Applying the Simulated Method 
of Moments (SMM) estimator delivers  κ = 2.77 and  γ = 1.92 , which implies a 
slightly higher dispersion of costs relative to the baseline calibration and a demand 
function that is still convex but closer to the linear demand benchmark. In this exer-
cise, we also evaluate the quantitative performance of the model along a number of 
 firm-level dimensions such as the degree of cost past through, the level of markups, 
the fraction of exporters, and export intensity, as well as aggregate ones such as the 
intensive and extensive margins of trade.
The estimates of the two parameters generate lower gains from trade liberal-
ization for the IA model. Indeed, using the approximation (47), the gains from a 
liberalization experiment are at most  
γκ ________   (γ + 1) (κ + 1) = 48.3 percent of the ACR gains. 
We have obtained similar quantitative results in Bertoletti, Etro, and Simonovska 
(2016), where we have retained our calibrated value  κ = 5 , and we have estimated 
the preference parameter to match moments (i) and (ii) above, which delivers a 
demand function that is approximately linear ( γ ≈ 1 ).
Second, given a value for  κ , one may refer to moments reported by the  pass-through 
literature to identify  γ (see, e.g., Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings 2014). The intuition 
behind such a strategy once again relies on the fact that the  demand-side parameter 
γ governs equilibrium objects such as prices, which for given product costs, contain 
information about firms’ markups and degree of  pass-through. Third, one may arrive 
at a value for  γ by directly estimating the demand system using  micro-level data 
on prices and quantities at the firm- or  product-level (see, e.g., ACDR, Broda and 
Weinstein 2006, and Feenstra and Weinstein 2017). For a given value of  κ , alterna-
tive estimates of  γ would shrink or widen the gap in predicted welfare between the 
homothetic and the IA model. In particular, lower values of  γ generate lower welfare 
gains in the IA model and therefore widen the difference in the predicted welfare lev-
els between the two classes of models. We leave it for future research to exploit rich 
 micro-level data and estimate the welfare gains from different liberalization episodes.
IV. Conclusion
The contribution of this work is to introduce  non-homothetic IA preferences to 
the literature on multi-country trade with heterogenous firms, quantify the welfare 
gains from trade under this class of preferences showing that it can be largely dif-
ferent from most alternative models, and propose a parametric specification that is 
highly tractable and useful for quantitative work. The model avoids the pervasive 
markup neutralities emerging in the CES model (Melitz 2003) and the limits of 
quasilinear preferences in general equilibrium applications (Melitz and Ottaviano 
2008). Between variable markup models, this is the only one able to jointly deliver 
prices increasing in destination income, independent from population of the destina-
tion country and characterized by incomplete  pass-through, with variable elasticities 
for firms of different productivity. Moreover, the model has novel implications for 
the extensive and intensive margins of trade that appear promising in front of the 
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limited evidence. The implication of such a model for the gains from trade liber-
alization, however, is our main result: these gains can be much lower than those 
implied by the models based on homothetic or directly additive preferences ana-
lyzed in ACR and ACDR.
Our setting could be usefully extended to consider strategic interactions (Atkeson 
and Burstein 2008 and Etro 2015), heterogenous consumers and income distribution 
(for the case of identical firms see Bertoletti and Etro 2017) and quality differen-
tiation (Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman 2011), more general preferences,42 
endogenous labor supply, and a 2 × 2 × 2 model with an outside good sold in a 
perfectly competitive setting to study the interplay with  inter-industry trade. Our 
tractable  non-homothetic preferences could also be exploited for dynamic analysis 
of structural change and business cycles.
Appendix
A. Social Planner Solution with IA Preferences
Consider the Social Planner Problem for the model of Section II:
   max 
N,  c ˆ, x(c), s(c) 
  {N  ∫ 0  c ˆ v (s(c))  dG(c)} 
subject to:
 N [ ∫ 0  c ˆ cx(c)L  dG(c)  +  F e ] = EL,
x(c) =    v ′ (s(c))   _________________ 
N  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ v ′ (s(c)) s(c) dG(c) , 
where the first is a resource constraint and the second is the demand associated with 
our preferences. Combining the two constraints, we simplify them to the condition:
  L  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ v ′ (s(c)) c dG(c)  =  (EL − N F e )  ∫ 0  c ˆ v ′ (s(c)) s(c) dG(c) . 
Given positive values for  N and  c ˆ , consider the Lagrangian:
  ℓ =  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ {v (s(c)) − λ v ′ (s(c)) [ (EL − N F e ) s(c)  − Lc] } g(c) dc. 
Pointwise maximization for  s(c) provides:
  v ′ (s(c)) − λ v ″ (s(c)) [ (EL − N F e ) s(c)  − Lc] − λ v ′ (s(c)) (EL − N F e ) = 0, 
42 For an analysis of monopolistic competition with general ( non-additive and  non-homothetic) preferences, see 
Bertoletti and Etro (2016). 
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which can be rearranged as
  s(c)  =  λθ (s (c) ) Lc  ______________________ λ [θ (s (c) ) − 1] (EL − N F e ) + 1 , 
assuming  θ > 1 . Replacing in the constraint, we have
  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ v ′ (s(c)) c [L −  
 (EL − N F e ) λθ (s (c) ) L
   _______________________  λ [θ (s (c) ) − 1] (EL − N F e ) + 1] dG(c)  = 0, 
where we can choose  λ = 1/ (EL − N F e ) to satisfy the above condition. This implies 
a linear optimal price function  s(c)  = Lc/(EL − N F e ) . Using this, we are left with 
the residual problem
  max  c ˆ, N 
  {N  ∫ 0  c ˆ v ( Lc ________ EL − N F e ) dG(c)} . 
Due to the absence of fixed costs of production, it is always optimal to consume any 
good that provides positive utility by setting  c ˆ(N ) = aE (1 −  N F e  ___EL ) . Therefore, the 
previous problem simplifies to
  max 
N
   N  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ(N) v ( Lc ________ EL − N F e ) dG(c), 
whose  first-order condition is
  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ(N) v (s(c)) dG(c)  +  N F e  ________ EL − N F e  ∫ 0  c ˆ(N) v ′ (s(c)) s(c) dG(c) = 0. 
This can be solved for
  N ∗ =  EL _______  F e (1 +  η ̅) , 
where we defined  η ̅ as a weighted average of the elasticity of the subutility 
 η(s) = − v ′ (s)s / v(s) > 0 , that is
  η ̅ ≡  ∫ 0  c ˆ( N ∗ ) η (s(c))  v(s(c))  ______________   ∫ 
0
  c ˆ( N ∗ ) v (s(c)) dG(c)  dG(c) > 0. 
It follows that the optimal cost cutoff is
  c ˆ∗ =  aE η ̅ ____
1 +  η ̅ < aE, 
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which implies that an excessive fraction of goods is consumed in equilibrium. 
Finally, the optimal price is
  p ∗ (c) = c (1 +  1 __ η ̅) , 
which is linear in the marginal cost.
Notice that integration per parts (using the linearity of  s(c) and assuming that 
v(s(0)) is finite) delivers
  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ( N ∗ ) v ′ (s(c)) s(c) dG(c) =  [v (s(c)) cg(c)] 
0
  c ˆ( N ∗ ) −  ∫ 
0
  c ˆ( N ∗ ) v (s(c)) [g(c)  + c g ′ (c)] dc 
  = − ∫ 
0
  c ˆ( N ∗ ) v (s(c)) [g(c) + c g ′ (c)] dc, 
which allows one to simplify  η ̅ as
  η ̅ =  
 ∫ 
0
  c ˆ( N ∗ ) v (s(c)) [g(c) + c g ′ (c)] dc
   ______________________   ∫ 
0
  c ˆ( N ∗ ) v (s(c)) dG(c) . 
If  G is a Pareto distribution, we then have  g(c) + c g ′ (c) = κg(c) , therefore  η ̅ = κ 
independently from the specification of  non-homothetic IA preferences.
B. Derivations for the Parametrized Model
Under our specification of preferences  v (s) =   (a − s) 1+γ  ______1 + γ and the assumption 
of a Pareto distribution, the prices  p ij of firms from country  i , which are actually 
active at destination  j (i.e., conditional on  c ≤  c ̂ij ), are distributed on the support 
 [ a E j /(1 + γ ), a E j ] according to
  F j ( p) =  Pr   
 
{ p ij ≤ p} =  Pr   
 { γc +  c ˆij  ______1 + γ  τ ij  w i ≤ p} =  (  (1 + γ) p ______γa E j  −  1 __γ) 
κ
 . 
This distribution is independent from trade costs and the identity of the exporting 
country, but depends on the income of the importing country  j . However, the distri-
bution of the normalized prices  s ij =  p ij / E j is identical across countries. Namely, on 
the support  [  a ___ 1 + γ , a] , it is given by (40), which depends only on the three param-
eters  γ ,  κ , and  a . The average price in country  j can then be easily calculated as 
follows:
(51)   피 { p j } =  ∫  a E j  ____
1+γ 
 a E j  p d F j ( p)  =  [p F j ( p)]  a E j  ___1+γ 
 a E j  −  ∫  a E j  ____
1+γ 
 a E j   F j ( p) dp 
  =  a E j  ____ κ + 1[κ +  1 ____ γ + 1] , 
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which is increasing in income and decreasing in  γ .
To obtain the distribution of the corresponding markups, notice that they are dis-
tributed on  [ 0, ∞] with
(52)   F m (m) =  Pr   
 
{ m ij ≤ m} =  Pr   
 { ( 1 ____ 1 + γ)  (  c ˆij − c _____c ) ≤ m} 
  =  Pr   
 {  c ˆij  __________ 1 +  (1 + γ) m ≤ c} = 1 −  
G (  c ˆij  ________ 1 +  (1 + γ) m) 
  ____________ 
G ( c ˆij )  
  = 1 −  1 ___________  [1 +  (1 + γ) m] κ . 
The average markup can be calculated as follows:
  피 {m} =  lim z→∞   { ∫ 0 z m d F m (m)} =  lim z→∞   { [m F m (m)] 0 z −  ∫ 0 z  F m (m) dm}  
  =  1 __________  (γ + 1)  (κ − 1) . 
This value averages low markups by marginal firms (selling virtually nothing) and 
high markups by better producers, especially by the extremely productive exporters. 
Given the skewed distribution, the median  markup is also of interest: this can be 
computed directly from (52) as  m Med =  ( 2 1/κ − 1) / (1 + γ ) .
Furthermore, it is straightforward to derive the distributions of the  pass-through 
and  pricing-to-market elasticities across all producing firms and compute moments 
from them. Using the Pareto distribution, the distributions of  pass-through and 
 pricing-to-market elasticities, which are the same across countries and independent 
from trade cost, satisfy
(53)  Pr { ϵ c ≤ ϵ} = 1 −  ( ϵ ______ γ(1 − ϵ )) 
κ  and Pr { ϵ E ≤ ϵ} = 1 −  ( 1 − ϵ ____γϵ ) 
κ ,  
respectively. Given these  closed-form distributions, the mean and median values 
can be easily computed, while the means plus standard deviations can be derived 
numerically. The average elasticity of price with respect to income is
(54)  피 { ϵ E (c)} =   c ˆij  _____ G(  c ˆij )  ∫ 0  c ˆij   dG(c) ______γc +  c ˆij  =  κ ____  c ˆ ij κ−1  ∫ 0  c 
ˆij    c κ−1  ______ γc +  c ˆij  dc 
  = κ  ∫ 
0
 1  t κ−1  (1 + γt) −1 dt with t ≡  c __  c ˆij 
  =  F 2,1 (1, κ; 1 + κ;  −γ ) ,  
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where  F 2,1 is the hypergeometric function
  F 2,1 (α, β; δ; z ) =  Γ(δ ) __________  Γ(β ) Γ(δ − β )  ∫ 0 1   t 
β−1  (1 − t ) δ−β−1   ____________  (1 − tz ) α   dt, 
with vector  (α, β )  = (1, κ ) , scalar  δ = κ + 1 , and argument  z = − γ ,43 and
  Γ(t )  =  ∫ 
0
 ∞  z t−1  e −z  dz 
is the Euler Gamma function (if the real part of  t is positive). The median elasticity 
of price with respect to income is  ϵ Med E = 1 / (1 + γ  2 −1/κ ) . One can also evaluate 
a weighted average elasticity with relative sales as weights, which corresponds to
  ϵ ̅E =  1 + γ + κ  __________  (1 + γ )(1 + κ ) ,
and is higher because more productive firms have larger market shares.
Finally, to derive the distribution of market shares in the text and to demonstrate 
that profits are a constant share of sales, which depends neither on the source coun-
try nor on the destination, we compute the expected value of the exports to country 
j of a firm based in country  i as follows:
  피 { t ij } =  ∫ 0  c ˆij   t ij (c) dG(c) 
  =  − γ 
γ  ( τ ij  w i ) γ+1  L j   ____________ (1 + γ ) γ+1  E j γ | μ j |   ∫ 0  c 
ˆij  [γ  ( c ˆij − c) γ − γ (γc +  c ˆij )  ( c ˆij − c) γ−1 ] G i (c) dc 
  =   γ 
γ+1  a γ+1  E j  L j   ______________  (1 + γ ) γ  _ cκ | μ j |  c ˆ ij γ+1  ∫ 0  c 
ˆij   ( c ˆij − c) γ−1  c κ+1 dc, 
where we integrated by parts. Changing the variable of integration with  t = c/ c ˆij , 
we obtain
(55)  피 { t ij } =   γ 
γ+1  a γ+1  E j  L j  c ˆ ij κ  ____________ (1 + γ ) γ  _ cκ | μ j |   ∫ 0 1  (1 − t) γ−1  t κ+1 dt 
  =   a κ+γ+1  γ γ+1 B(κ + 2, γ )   ________________ (1 + γ ) γ  _ cκ   
 L j  E j κ+1  _________  | μ j |  ( τ ij  w i ) κ . 
43 In Matlab, however, the Hypergeometric function,  hypergeom(a, b, z ) , corresponds to the generalized 
Hypergeometric function, where  a is a vector of “upper parameters,”  b is vector of “lower parameters” and  z is the 
argument.  F 2, 1 (α, β; δ; z ) is the special case where  a = (α, β ) is a 1 by 2 matrix and  b = δ is a scalar. 
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This allows us to derive the average sales and the expression for the market share 
(43). Similarly, the expected profit  피 { π ij } in country  j for a firm based in country  i 
is given by
(56)  피 { π ij } =  ∫ 0  c ˆij   π ij (c) dG(c) =   γ γ κB(κ, γ + 2 )  a κ+γ+1    ________________ (1 + γ ) 1+γ  _ cκ    L j  E j 
κ+1  ________  ( τ ij  w i ) κ | μ j | . 
The ratio of the two aggregate objects is then obtained by the recursive properties of 
the Euler Beta function:
  
피 { π ij }  ______피 { t ij }  =  
κB(κ, γ + 2 )  ______________ γ(1 + γ ) B(κ + 2, γ ) =  1 ____ κ + 1 . 
C. Equivalent Variation for IA Preferences
Consider the general case of IA preferences. In this case it is convenient to work 
with the “unconditional” distribution,  G ij (χ ) , of the marginal cost  χ =  τ ij  w i c in 
country  j by firms from country  i , which has a support  [0,  τ ij  w i _ c] , and it is given by
  G ij (χ ) =  Pr   
 {c ≤  χ ____  τ ij  w i } = G ( χ ____  τ ij  w i ) =  ( χ _____  τ ij  w i  c) 
κ . 
Let  p j (χ ) be the equilibrium mapping between marginal costs and prices that only 
depends on  E j .44 We can then write welfare (25) as
  V j =  ∑ 
i=1
I
  N i  ∫ b E j  a W j  v ( p ___  W j ) d F ij ( p) 
  =  ∑ 
i=1
I
  N i  ∫ 0  
_ χj  v (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  ) d G ij (χ ) 
  =  ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  v (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  ) d (χ) κ  ∑ i=1
I
  N i  ( τ ij  w i _ c) −κ , 
44 This is given by (14) for all the varieties actually sold in country  j when income is  E j , but it is not uniquely 
defined above the cutoff  a E j . One can make the mild assumption that  p j (χ ) is everywhere monotonic and differen-
tiable; however, in computing the  E V j for the functional form of our example, we assume that all prices follow the 
same pricing rule (34). 
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where  W j =  E j + E V j (see the discussion concerning the definition of the Equivalent 
Variation  E V j in the text) and  _ χj is defined by the condition  p j (  _ χj ) ≡ a W j . 
Accordingly, taking logs, differentiating and integrating by parts we obtain
(57)  d ln  V j = d ln { ∫ 0  
_ χj  v (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  ) d  (χ) κ } 
  =  
− ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  v ′ (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )   p j (χ ) ____ W j   d  (χ) κ    ___________________  
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  v (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  ) d  (χ) κ 
 d ln  W j 
  =  
κ  ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  v ′ (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1 dχ   _____________________
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  v ′ (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j ′ (χ )  χ κ dχ
 d ln  W j 
  = κ  
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
∫ 
0
  
_ χj    p j ′ (χ ) χ ______ p j (χ )  
 v ′ (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1    ___________________  
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  v ′ (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1 dχ
 dχ
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
−1
 d ln  W j 
  = κ  
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
∫ 
0
  
_ χj   ϵ j c (χ )  
x (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1    ___________________  
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  x (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1 dχ
 dχ
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
−1
 d ln  W j 
  = κ  
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
1 −  ∫ 
0
  
_ χj   ϵ j E (χ )  
x (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1    ___________________  
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  x (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1 dχ
 dχ
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
−1
 d ln  W j 
 = κ  [1 −  ϵ ̅j E ( W j ,  E j ) ] −1 d ln  W j , 
where we define
  ϵ j c (χ ) ≡  ∂ ln  p j (χ ) ________∂ ln χ ≡ 1 −  ϵ j E (χ ) , 
and
(58)  ϵ ̅j E ( W j ,  E j ) ≡  ∫ 0  
_ χj   ϵ j E (χ )  
x (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1    ___________________  
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj  x (  p j (χ ) ____ W j  )  p j (χ )  χ κ−1 dχ
 dχ. 
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The local approximation in the text, valid for small  E V j , can be obtained by letting 
 W j =  E j and computing  ϵ ̅j E as a weighted average (with relative sales as weights) 
of the elasticity of prices with respect to income,  ϵ ij E (c ) = ∂ ln  p ij (c)/∂ ln  E j , which 
explains our notation.
For our specific functional form, we obtain  
_ χj = a [ (γ + 1)  W j −  E j ] / γ and
(59)
 ϵ ̅j E ( W j ,  E j ) =  ∫ 0  
_ χj   a E j  ______ γχ + a E j  
 {a [ (γ + 1)  W j −  E j ] − γχ} γ (γχ + a E j )  χ κ−1      _________________________________   
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj   {a [ (γ + 1)  W j −  E j ] − γχ} γ (γχ + a E j )  χ κ−1 dχ
 dχ 
  =  
a E j  ∫ 0  
_ χj   {1 −  γχ __________ a [ (γ + 1)  W j −  E j ] } 
γ  χ κ−1 dχ
    _________________________________    
 ∫ 
0
  
_ χj   {1 −  γχ __________ a [ (γ + 1)  W j −  E j ] } 
γ (γ  χ κ + a E j κ−1 χ) dχ
  =  a E j  ∫ 0 1  {1 − t} γ  t κ−1 dt   _______________________    ∫ 
0
 1  {1 − t} γ (γ  _ χj  t κ + a E j  t κ−1 ) dt
  =   a E j B(κ, γ + 1 )   _________________________  γ  _ χj B(κ + 1, γ + 1 )  + a E j B(κ, γ + 1 )
 =    (κ + γ + 1)  E j   _____________  [κ  W j +  E j ]  (γ + 1) , 
which gives (46) in the text.
D. Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantify the model’s key predictions. First, we revisit the 
model’s implications and we derive testable predictions that can be compared to 
moments in the data. Second, we outline a strategy to identify the model’s parame-
ters and we evaluate the quantitative fit of the model to observations from  cross-firm 
and  cross-country data. Third, we design a counterfactual exercise to quantify the 
welfare gains from trade predicted by the model.
Background.—As described in the main text, in order to quantify the welfare 
gains from trade predicted by the model, we need data on trade shares and  per cap-
ita income as well as estimates of two key parameters,  κ and  γ . In this section, we 
describe a structural approach toward identifying these two parameters. We discuss 
the merits of this approach amid data limitations in Section D4, Step 3.
AQ9
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Our identification approach demands that we also take a stand on a number of 
additional parameters that characterize the model. Since the model falls within a 
large class of models that generate a  log-linear gravity equation of trade, the two 
key parameters,  κ and  γ , together with a set of country- and  country-pair-specific 
parameters that can be estimated using the model’s structural gravity equation of 
trade, are sufficient to generate a set of moments that can be used to judge the 
 model’s fit to the data.45
Recall the theoretical gravity equation of trade derived in expression (49). Let 
S i = exp ( S ̃i ) , a transformation that will be used extensively as we proceed.
Once we have obtained estimates for the parameters  κ and  γ , as well as for the 
objects  S i for all  i = 1, … , I and  τ ij for all  country-pairs  i, j (see Section D.4 for 
estimation), we can compute predicted  per capita income levels for each country 
from the model’s predicted market clearing conditions using data for actual trade 
shares  λ ij for all  i, j pairs and population size  L j for all countries  j . In particular, refer 
to expression (23), where by definition  per capita income in country  i is  E i =  w i  e i . 
After normalizing population size,  L i , relative to a numeraire, we can obtain  per cap-
ita incomes,  E i , for any  i , relative to a numeraire, using data on  L i and  λ ij for all  i, j 
from the system of equations (23) for all  i . Let  P denote the vector of the parameters 
necessary for simulation in matrix notation, namely  P =  {κ, γ, τ, E, L, S} , where 
E′ =  [ E 1 , … ,  E I ] and  S′ =  [ S 1 , … ,  S I ] , and let  Λ denote the bilateral  trade-share 
matrix with typical element  λ ij .
With  P and  Λ in hand, we can compute all endogenous objects in the model that 
are necessary to derive a number of moments that we can use to identify  κ and  γ . 
We begin by computing cost cutoffs. Expression (15) suggests that a value for the 
parameter  a would be needed in order to obtain cost cutoffs. As it turns out, it is 
sufficient to compute cost cutoffs relative to a numeraire cutoff, in order to derive 
the moments of interest; hence, we will not need to take a stand on the value of  a 
because the parameter scales all cutoffs. Below we will describe how we select the 
numeraire cutoff. We begin by revisiting the model’s predictions and translating 
them into moments from the model that are expressed as functions of normalized 
cutoffs,  P , and  Λ .46
Empirical Predictions.—The key empirical prediction that differentiates our 
model from existing frameworks relates to the behavior of prices across destina-
tions; namely prices are higher in richer countries, but they do not vary with respect 
to market size. We discussed this prediction in the main text and we derived moment 
conditions for the key price elasticities there. Below, we revisit the remaining quan-
titative predictions of the model.
 Pass-through and  markups across firms: In the model, more productive exporters 
price to market more or, alternatively, they enjoy lower cost  pass-through. In expres-
sion (53) in Appendix section B, we have derived the distribution of the  elasticity of 
45 Simonovska and Waugh (2014a,b) demonstrate this fact for models that rely on homothetic preferences, while 
Jung, Simonovska, and Weinberger (2015) analyze models that belong to a class of directly additive preferences. 
46 It is worth noting that we will not need to estimate the parameter  F e for the purpose of our exercises. 
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price with respect to income, which, as already mentioned, corresponds to the elas-
ticity with respect to the real exchange rate. We reproduce it below for convenience:
  Pr { ϵ E ≤ ϵ} = 1 −  ( 1 − ϵ ____γϵ ) 
κ . 
Given estimates of  κ and  γ , in addition to the mean of this distribution as illus-
trated above, we can also compute the mean plus 1 standard deviation response to 
exchange rate changes. This allows us to compare both measures to the correspond-
ing moments in the data so as to test the prediction that small (or less productive) 
firms pass through cost changes more.
Finally, the distribution of  markups is given in expression (41). With estimates 
of  κ and  γ at hand, we can derive moments from the  markup distribution and com-
pare them to data. In particular, the mean markup is  피 {m} =  1 ________  (γ + 1)  (κ − 1) , which is 
decreasing in  κ > 1 and  γ .
Extensive margin of trade: The extensive margin of trade was derived in expres-
sion (18) for general IA preferences. It varies across source and destination coun-
tries. Given a source country  i , let  j ∗ denote a numeraire destination. The ratio of the 
extensive margin for destination  j , relative to the numeraire, is
(60)  ex t ij =  (  E j  ____ E  j ∗   ) 
κ
 (  τ ij  ____ τ i j ∗   ) 
−κ
 . 
Taking logs of the above expression allows us to obtain elasticities of the extensive 
margin with respect to destination specific characteristics. Hence, the model pre-
dicts that, for a given source country, the extensive margin of trade is increasing in 
 per capita income with an elasticity of  κ and falling in trade costs with an elasticity 
of  − κ . With an estimate of trade costs at hand, we can also compute the elasticity 
of the extensive margin with respect to distance to the destination, and compare it 
to data.
Intensive margin of trade: The intensive margin of trade was derived in expres-
sion (20) for general IA preferences. It measures the average sales for firms in a par-
ticular destination and it is independent of the source country. Letting country  j ∗ be 
a numeraire destination, and using the definition of the gravity object  S i , the ratio of 
the intensive margin for destination  j , relative to the numeraire, can be rewritten as
(61)  int j =   E j  L j  _______ E j ∗  L j ∗   ( 
 E j  ____ E  j ∗   ) 
−κ
  (  ∑ k  S k  τ kj 
−κ  ________ ∑ k  S k  τ k j ∗  −κ ) 
−1
 .
Taking logs of both sides of the expression yields the following: controlling for 
aggregate effects (summation terms), the elasticity of the intensive margin with 
respect to destination GDP is  1 and the elasticity of the intensive margin with respect 
to destination  per capita income is  − κ .
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Sales and measured productivity advantage of exporters: More efficient firms 
realize higher sales. Moreover, trade barriers prevent less efficient firms from 
exporting, which implies that exporters enjoy an efficiency and sales advantage over 
 non-exporters. Below, we derive two moments of interest from the distributions 
of measured productivity and sales of firms: the measured productivity and sales 
advantage of exporters over  non-exporters. We derive these moments because we 
can readily compare them to their data counterparts.
Exporter sales advantage: In order to derive moments for exporters and 
 non-exporters from any source country  i , it is useful to define a cost cutoff that 
separates firms into these two groups. In particular, using the characterization for 
cost cutoffs in expression (15), define the cost cutoff for exporters from country  i as
(62)  c ̃ij ≡  max 
k≠i 
   a E k  ____ τ ik w i  .
Notice that any firm from country  i with cost  c <  c ̃ij is an exporter to some coun-
try  k and any firm with cost  c ∈ [  c ̃ij ,  c ̂ii ] serves the domestic market only.47 This 
follows from the fact that firms differ only along the cost dimension, so there is a 
strict ordering of markets by toughness, with the destination  k ″ being toughest for 
 i ’s producers if  c ̂i k ″  ≤  c ̂i k ′   ∀ k ′ . Thus, we can refer to country  j that satisfies the defi-
nition in expression (62) as the most accessible foreign destination for firms from  i .
Having categorized firms into exporters and  non-exporters, the first moment we 
are interested in is the ratio between the average domestic sales of exporters and 
the average sales of  non-exporters from any country  i .48 Consider any firm from 
country  i ; its domestic sales are given by expression (35), where destination  j = i . 
Integrating over all exporters, then integrating over all  non-exporters, and finally 
taking the ratio of the two yields the exporter sales advantage at home, which we 
denote by  H ̃1 :
 H ̃1 =  
 [ (  c ̂ii  __ c ̃ij ) 
κ − 1]  [B (  c ̃ij  __ c ̂ii ; κ, γ + 2) +  (1 + γ) B (  c ̃ij  __ c ̂ii ; κ + 1, γ + 1) ]        _______________________________________________________ 
B (κ, γ + 2) − B (  c ̃ij  __ c ̂ii ; κ, γ + 2) +  (1 + γ)  [B (κ + 1, γ + 1) − B (  c ̃ij  __ c ̂ii ; κ + 1, γ + 1) ] 
, 
where  B(u; z, h ) is the incomplete (Euler) Beta function:
  B(u; z, h )  =  ∫ 
0
 u  t z−1  (1 − t ) h−1 dt. 
47 This implicitly assumes that trade barriers are high enough so that  c ̂ii >  c ̂ik  ∀ k ≠ i . 
48 We follow Bernard et al. (2003) and derive this ratio because we will be comparing the model’s predicted 
moment to the corresponding moment from the US distribution reported by these authors. 
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To see that  H ̃1 depends on  P only, define  y ij ≡   max k≠i  E k  τ ik 
−1   ___________ E i  . Using the expressions 
for cost cutoffs in (15) and (62), it immediately follows that  c ̂ii / c ̃ij =  y ij −1 . Then, our 
desired moment, now denoted by  H 1 , can be rewritten as
(63)   H 1 (P) =  [ y ij −κ − 1] 
×   B(  y ij ; κ, γ + 2 )  +  (1 + γ) B(  y ij ; κ + 1, γ + 1 )      ______________________________________________________  
B(κ, γ + 2 )  − B(  y ij ; κ, γ + 2 )  +  (1 + γ)  [B(κ + 1, γ + 1 )  − B(  y ij ; κ + 1, γ + 1 )] , 
where the dependence on  P only is made explicit.
Exporter measured productivity advantage: The second moment of interest 
is the measured productivity advantage of exporters over  non-exporters. In the 
absence of intermediate goods, the value added of a firm is the ratio of its sales to 
the number of employees. Firm sales are given in expression (35). To derive the 
number of workers, notice that the production function of a  c- firm from country  i 
selling in country  j is  x ij =  l ij / (  τ ij c ) , where  τ ij c is its “unit labor requirement” and 
 l ij (c) =  τ ij c  x ij (c) its conditional labor demand. The corresponding number of 
employed workers is given by  τ ij c x ij (c)/ e i .
With this in mind, the measured productivity, or the value added per worker, of a 
 non-exporter with cost draw  c ∈ [  c ̃ij ,  c ̂ii ] from country  i is
  v a i nx (c) =   e i  t ii (c) _______c τ ii  x ii (c) =  w i  e i [1 +  m ii (c)] . 
Similarly, the measured productivity, or the value added per worker, of an exporter 
with cost draw  c <  c ̃ij is
  v a i x (c) =   e i  ∑ k∈ K i (c)  t ik (c)  ________________c  ∑ k∈ K i (c)  τ ik  x ik (c) , 
where  K i (c) is the set of destinations  k such that  c ≤  c ˆik .
Taking logs of both variables, integrating over all exporters and  non-exporters, 
respectively, and taking the difference of the two yields the exporter measured pro-
ductivity advantage (in percentage terms),49 which we denote by  H ̃2 :
  H ̃2 =  ∫ 0  c ̃ij  log (v a i x (c))  κ  c κ−1 _____  c ̃ij κ   dc −  ∫  c ̃ij   c ̂ii  log (v a i nx (c))  κ  c κ−1 _______  c ̂ii κ −  c ̃ij κ  dc. 
49 See the preceding footnote. 
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As was the case for  H ̃1 above, it can be shown that  H ̃2 can be  re-expressed in 
terms only of  P and  Λ , and denoted by  H 2 (P, Λ) . Focus first on the value added of 
 non-exporters and substitute out the  markup equation to obtain
  v a i nx (c) =   E i  ____ 1 + γ(γ +  
 c ̂ii  __c ) . 
Taking logs yields
  log (v a i nx (c)) = log (  E i  ____ 1 + γ) + log (γ +   c ̂ii  __c ) . 
Integrating over all  non-exporters yields
  V A i nx = log (  E i  ____ 1 + γ) +  1 _______  c ̂ii κ −  c ̃ij κ  ∫  c ̃ij   c ̂ii  log (γ +   c ̂ii  __c ) κ  c κ−1 dc. 
Apply the following change of variables:  t ij = c/ c ̂ij . Then  V A i nx becomes
  V A i nx = log (  E i  ____ 1 + γ) +  κ _____ 1 −  y ij κ  ∫  y ij  1 log (γ +  t ii −1 )  t ii κ−1 d t ii , 
where  y ij is defined as above.
Next, focus on the value added for an exporter. For any exporter from country  i 
with cost draw  c define the following indicator function:  δ ij (c) = 1 if  c <  c ̂ij and zero 
otherwise. Let  Δ ij (c) be a vector of size  I with typical element  δ ij (c ) . Substituting 
in the equations for firm sales and output, the value added for an exporter can then 
be rewritten as
  v a i x (c)  =  
 e i  ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (c)   L k  (  τ ik  w i ) 
1+γ (γc +  c ̂ik )  (  c ̂ik − c ) γ    __________________(1 + γ )  (  w k  e k ) γ |  μ k |   ______________________________   
c  ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (c)   τ ik  L k  (  τ ik  w i ) 
γ  (  c ̂ik − c ) γ _____________   (  w k  e k ) γ |  μ k | 
 . 
Furthermore, substituting in for  | μ k | , and using the definition of  λ kk obtains
  v a i x (c)  =   E i  ____ 1 + γ  
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
γ +  
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (c)   τ ik 
1+γ  (  c ̂ik − c ) γ  λ kk  L k   ___________  (  E k ) γ+κ  S k   
 c ̂ik  __c   _______________________
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (c)   τ ik 
1+γ  (  c ̂ik − c ) γ  λ kk  L k   ___________  (  E k ) γ+κ  S k  
 
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
. 
Taking logs and integrating over all exporters yields
 V A i x = log (  E i  ____ 1 + γ) +  1 __  c ̃ij κ  ∫ 0  c ̃ij  log 
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
γ +  
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (c)   τ ik 
1+γ  (  c ̂ik − c ) γ  λ kk  L k   ___________  (  E k ) γ+κ  S k   
 c ̂ik  __c   _______________________
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (c)   τ ik 
1+γ  (  c ̂ik − c ) γ  λ kk  L k   ___________  (  E k ) γ+κ  S k  
 
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
κ c κ−1 dc. 
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Applying the change of variables,  t ij = c/ c ̂ij ,  V A i x becomes
 V A i x = log (  E i  ____ 1 + γ) + κ  y ij −κ  ∫ 0  y ij  log  
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
γ +  
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (  c ̂ii  t ii )   λ kk  L k  _______  (  E k ) κ−1  S k  (1 −  t ii  
 E i  τ ik  ___ E k  ) 
γ  1 ___  t ii  E i    _______________________________ 
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ik (  c ̂ii  t ii )   τ ik  λ kk  L k  ______ (  E k ) κ  S k  (1 −  t ii  
 E i  τ ik  ___ E k  ) 
γ 
 
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
 t ii κ−1 d t ii . 
Taking the difference between exporters and  non-exporters yields the desired 
moment  H 2 :
(64)   H 2 (P, Λ) = κ  y ij −κ  ∫ 0  y ij  log 
⎡
 ⎢
⎣
γ +  
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ̃ik (  t ii )   λ kk  L k  _______  (  E k ) κ−1  S k  (1 −  t ii  
 E i  τ ik  ___ E k  ) 
γ  1 ___  t ii  E i    _____________________________
 ∑ k=1 I  δ ̃ik (  t ii )   τ ik  λ kk  L k  ______ (  E k ) κ  S k  (1 −  t ii  
 E i  τ ik  ___ E k  ) 
γ 
 
⎤
 ⎥
⎦
 t ii κ−1 d t ii 
  −   κ _____ 
1 −  y ij κ  ∫  y ij  1 log (γ +  t ii −1 )  t ii κ−1 d t ii ,  
where the dependence on  P and  Λ is made explicit. In the above expression,  δ ̃ik is 
a transformation of  δ ik that only depends on  P and  Λ . Thus, it remains to show that 
t ii and  Δ ̃ ik depend on  P and  Λ . This argument can be found in the description of the 
simulation algorithm below.
Wages: The two  firm-level moments derived above rely on the endogenous wage, 
w i , of the country whose exporters are simulated. In principle, should we simulate 
exporters for all countries, we would need to separately identify wages for all coun-
tries. However, the exporter moments that we will try to reconcile are only made 
available for US exporters by Bernard et al. (2003). Assuming that the two key 
parameters,  κ and  γ , are not  country-specific, we can generate the moments from 
the model for US exporters by only simulating observations for US exporters. In this 
case, we let  w US = 1 .
Simulation algorithm.—In this model, there exists a continuum of firms; hence, 
the first step in the simulation is to recognize that the continuum needs to be dis-
cretized and the number of simulated draws has to be large enough so as to best 
approximate the entire continuum. In principle, one would need to simulate a very 
large number of draws for each country; which can be a daunting task. The task, 
however, is greatly simplified due to the fact that cost draws are transformations 
of random variables drawn from a  parameter-free uniform distribution, where the 
transformation function depends on  P . This powerful insight draws on arguments 
first made transparent by Bernard et al. (2003) within the context of a model with 
a fixed measure of firms and subsequently by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) 
within a model with an endogenous measure of firms.
Recall that our goal is to simulate a large number of cost draws,  c , from the pdf 
given by  g i (c) = κ  c κ−1 /  c ̂ii κ, which ensures that  c ∈ [ 0,  c ̂ii ] for all  i .50 Given these 
50 It would be futile to simulate firms with higher cost draws than this upper bound because they would imme-
diately exit in equilibrium. 
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draws, we can proceed to compute exporting costs and determine the subset of firms 
from each source country  i that serve each destination  j . With this in mind we pro-
ceed as follows. We draw 500,000 realizations51 of the uniform distribution on the 
[ 0, 1 ] domain,  U [ 0, 1 ] , we order them in increasing order, and find the maximum 
realization, denoted by  u max . Then, we let  c =  (u/ u max )  1 _κ  c ̂ii . Notice that  c ∈ [ 0,  c ̂ii ] 
by construction, and it has pdf of  g i (c) = κ   c κ−1  ___ c ̂ii κ ; yet the normalization allows us 
to utilize all draws. Multiplying each  c by the appropriate wage rate and trade cost 
yields the cost to serve each market. Comparing this cost to the cost cutoff for each 
 source-destination pair determines the set of exporters to every destination.
What remains is to decide the  source-destination cost cutoff pair that serves as 
numeraire. This choice depends on the particular exercise that one intends to engage 
in. The objective of the normalization, however, is always the same: the numeraire 
is chosen so as to maximize the usage of the 500,000 draws from the uniform distri-
bution. As we describe below, in at least one of the exercises, we choose to identify 
the key parameters of interest,  κ and  γ , from moments for US firms; thus, we need to 
simulate observations for all US producers—both domestic and exporting. To max-
imize the number of draws used, we choose the numeraire cost cutoff to be  c ̂US,US . 
Hence, all simulated firms serve at least the US and a subset of them serve different 
export markets.
Estimation.—In order to numerically generate the moments from the model that 
we outline above, we first need to estimate the model’s parameters and then simu-
late  micro-level data. The estimation can be divided into the following three steps: 
(i) estimate a set of country(-pair) parameters using the model’s predicted grav-
ity equation of trade and data; (ii) use  gravity-based estimates, together with data 
on population size, to estimate  per capita income levels from the model’s market 
clearing condition; (iii) use parameters from (i) and (ii), together with moments of 
choice to identify the remaining parameters,  γ and  κ .
Step 1: The empirical gravity equation of trade that corresponds to the theoretical 
prediction derived in expression (49) is given by
(65)  log (  λ ij  __ λ jj ) =  S ̃i −  S ̃j − κ log  τ ij +  ε ij ,  
where  ε ij is a  country-pair residual error term. We assume that the bilateral trade cost 
takes on the following functional form:
(66)  log  τ ij =  β d log  d ij + e x i +  β k  d k +  β h  d h ,  
where  β d is the coefficient estimate on the log of the bilateral distance in kilometers, 
d ij ,  e x i is an exporter fixed effect as in Waugh (2010),  d h is an indicator that takes 
51 The quantitative results are nearly identical when we use a grid of 2,000,000. One key difference is that US 
exporters serve a larger number of destinations in this case; namely, there are fewer zeros in the trade matrix. 
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on the value of 1 if trade is internal with coefficient  β h , and  β k is a  5 × 1 vector of 
coefficients on a matrix of 5 indicators,  d k , where each indicator takes on the value 
of 1 if countries  i and  j : (i) share a border, (ii) have a common official or primary 
language, (iii) have a common colonizer post 1945, (iv) have a regional trade agree-
ment (RTA) in force, and (v) share a common currency.
After substituting expression (66) into (65), we estimate the coefficients for 123 
countries via OLS using source and destination fixed effects.52 We exclude trade 
share observations that take on the value of zero. A description of the (standard) 
datasets used in the estimation and the results from the gravity estimation can be 
found in Appendix section E. We present the estimates of the gravity equation in 
Appendix section F, and we plot the predicted and actual trade shares in Section D.5.
A couple of notes are in order. First, all parameter estimates pertaining to 
the trade costs are scaled by  κ . Thus, the gravity equation allows us to estimate 
 κ log  τ ij only, rather than to separately identify  κ from  τ ij . We present our identifica-
tion strategy for  κ in Step 3 below. Second, domestic trade costs are also estimated 
in this step and they are not necessarily equal to unity. Hence, before we proceed, 
we normalize all international trade costs, relative to their domestic counterparts.
Step 2: We compute  per capita incomes using the model’s implied market clearing 
equation together with data on trade shares and population size for all 123 countries. 
In particular, we employ expression (23), where by definition  per capita income in 
country  i is  E i =  w i  e i . After normalizing population size,  L i , relative to a numeraire 
country, which we take to be the United States, we can obtain  per capita incomes,  E i , 
for all  i ≠ US , relative to the United States, using data on  L i and  λ ij for all  i, j from 
this system of equations. We describe the data sources in Appendix section E, and 
we plot the predicted and actual  per capita income in Section D.5.
Step 3: It remains to choose an identification strategy for the key remaining 
parameters that characterize the welfare gains from trade:  κ and  γ . In principle, 
these two parameters govern more than two moments in the model. Hence, different 
sets of moments will result in different estimates for these parameters, different fits 
of model to data, and different estimates of the gains from trade. The main challenge 
is to select the moments that are (i) most informative about these two parameters 
and (ii) directly informative about the welfare gains from trade.
The parameter  κ is a  supply-side parameter; it is the shape parameter that gov-
erns the dispersion of the intrinsic productivity distribution, Pareto. The parameter 
γ is a  demand-side parameter in our model—it governs the elasticity of demand 
with respect to price as well as the elasticity of price with respect to income and the 
 pass-through elasticity. Consequently, the parameter is at the heart of the model’s 
pricing predictions, which are the key departure from the standard ACR framework. 
In addition, for given  κ ,  γ governs the distribution of firm sales. These two obser-
vations imply that  γ is a critical input into the firm  sales-weighted elasticity of price 
with respect to income, which quantifies the welfare gains predicted by our model.
52 For a detailed discussion on how to separately identify the coefficients  S i from  e x i see Simonovska and Waugh (2014a). 
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With this in mind, we proceed with an overidentified estimation strategy for  γ and 
κ by jointly targeting the following three moments: (i) the average elasticity of price 
with respect to income from  micro-level data, (ii) the domestic sales advantage of 
exporters over  non-exporters for the United States, and (iii) the measured productiv-
ity advantage of exporters over  non-exporters for the United States.
We choose these moments for the following reasons. First, our model differs from 
existing alternatives precisely along the pricing dimension. It predicts that the price 
elasticity with respect to income is positive, while the price elasticity with respect to 
market size is zero. Therefore, targeting the price elasticity with respect to income 
seems to be a natural choice. Second, it is the price elasticity with respect to income 
(or, alternatively the  pass-through elasticity: recall the definition of  ϵ ̅j E ), weighted 
by each firm’s relative sales, that constitutes the object that governs the welfare 
gains in our model. Therefore, the distribution of firm sales together with the price 
elasticity with respect to income are crucial elements in determining the magni-
tude of welfare gains from trade. Third, if we had access to  firm-level sales data as 
well as firms’ prices of identical goods sold across multiple destinations, then we 
could have directly estimated  ϵ ̅j E (or the  pass-through elasticity) instead of having 
to estimate  γ . However, to our knowledge, such detailed data are not readily avail-
able. Given data limitations, we opted for the structural approach described above. 
Finally, the third moment seems natural as  κ governs the shape of the productivity 
distribution in the model; thus, the measured productivity advantage of exporters is 
a very informative moment.
In sum, to identify  κ and  γ we combine objects from Steps 1 and 2 with three 
 model-generated moments: (i) the domestic sales advantage of US exporters over 
 non-exporters, or  H 1 (P) given in expression (63); (ii) the  value-added advantage 
of US exporters over  non-exporters, or  H 2 (P, Λ) given in expression (64); and (iii) the average elasticity of price with respect to income from  micro-level data, or 
 피 { ϵ E } given in expression (50). To compute the first two moments, we let the source 
country  i = US and we consider all 123 potential destinations referred to in Steps 1 
and 2 (the third moment is country invariant in the model). Finally, we employ the 
SMM estimator with an identity weighting matrix, which prevents us from comput-
ing meaningful standard errors.53
On the technical side, to compute the first two moments, we need to separately 
identify  w US from  e US because only  w US enters unit costs of production as well as 
cost cutoffs. Since we normalize all  per capita incomes (and sizes) relative to the 
United States, this would imply that both  w US = 1 and  e US = 1 . Notice that by con-
struction this implies that we need to normalize all  S k s relative to  S US so that  S US = 1 . 
Because  log ( S k ) is the object that we estimate from gravity, we first exponentiate 
this object for every  k and then we divide it through by the exponent of the object 
for the United States.
Quantitative Results: Moments, Parameters, and Fit.—Table 1 summarizes the 
three moments that we target, the data sources, as well as the resulting  parameters 
53 Results obtained using the optimal weighting matrix are available upon request. 
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that match those moments.54 The price elasticity moment is the preferred estimate 
obtained by Simonovska (2015).55 In this overidentified approach, we employ 
the identity matrix to weigh the three moments that the two parameters attempt to 
jointly match.
When we let  κ and  γ jointly match moments from the sales, measured productiv-
ity, and price elasticity distribution, the estimated  γ amounts to 1.92, while  κ centers 
around 2.77.
In Table 2,we explore the basic fit of the estimated model to a variety of moments. 
Unlike the moments displayed in Table 1, which we target in the identification of 
the model’s parameters, the moments in Table 2 serve for external validation as they 
are not targeted. The model predicts that the share of US firms that export is roughly 
16 percent, in line with US data for year 1992 reported in Bernard et al. (2003). 
The resulting export intensity in the model is even more skewed than observed in 
the data and it reflects the prediction that a large number of US firms that export 
sell very little abroad—that is to say most exporters sell tiny amounts abroad even 
though they enjoy a large domestic sales advantage over  non-exporters.
Furthermore, the mean price elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate is 
equivalent to the mean price elasticity with respect to  per capita income of 0.43 (the 
median being 0.4), while the mean plus one standard deviation estimate is 0.51. 
We interpret these elasticities as equilibrium elasticities for the broad manufactur-
ing sector. These estimates are qualitatively in line with, but exceed in magnitude, 
the findings in Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) for a set of French exporters to 
 non-Eurozone destinations.
The average cost  pass-through predicted by the model is exactly one minus the 
 pricing-to-market elasticity reported above and amounts to 0.57, which is within 
54 The  firm-level moments reported in Bernard et al. (2003) are for the universe of US firms in 1992. Bernard 
et al. (2007) document similar statistics using 2002 US  firm-level data. 
55 In Table 1 of their paper, Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) estimate this parameter using  HS-10 digit unit 
value data for US exports of final/consumption goods recorded at the port of shipping to 28 destinations during 
the  1989–2000 period. While the prices do not include shipping costs and  destination-specific  non-tradable compo-
nents, they may reflect quality variations, which is why we opt to target the moment in Simonovska (2015) instead. 
Two observations are in order. First, our model predicts that the mean price elasticity is country invariant; thus, com-
bining the sales moment for the United States with the price elasticity moment for Spain is not problematic. Second, 
 re-estimating the model with Alessandria and Kaboski’s (2015) moment as a target yields nearly identical results. 
Table 1—Moments and Parameters
Moment Model Data Source
US exporter productivity advantage 0.35 0.33 Bernard et al. (2003)
US exporter sales advantage 4.81 4.8 Bernard et al. (2003)
Mean price elasticity of income 0.43 0.14 Simonovska (2015)
Population relative to United States (N − 1) × 1 vector  WDI
Bilateral trade shares Gravity Comtrade
Parameter Value   
γ 1.919   
κ 2.772   
L (N − 1) × 1 vector   
τ Gravity   
48 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2018
the range of 0. 36–0.57 reported by De Loecker et al. (2016) for Indian manufactur-
ing firms. Finally, given our estimated parameters, the average markup amounts to 
19 percent, which is in line with common findings in the macroeconomic literature 
(see Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008).
Prices across destinations: Our model predicts that prices are increasing in 
destination  per capita income and are independent of destination population size. 
Given our estimates of  κ and  γ , the mean elasticity of price with respect to  per 
capita income is 0.43. In turn, the price elasticity with respect to population is zero. 
These estimates compare qualitatively to estimates reported in the empirical litera-
ture, although the predicted elasticity of price with respect to income does exceed 
the corresponding moment in the data. In particular, Simonovska (2015) finds that 
a Spanish apparel retailer systematically price discriminates according to the  per 
capita income of destinations, but does not vary prices across countries of differ-
ent population sizes. The typical estimate of the elasticity of price with respect to 
income that the author obtains circles around 0.14, which corresponds to one of 
the targets that we use in our estimation. While the predicted moment exceeds the 
target, we interpret the model as representing the broad manufacturing sector rather 
than apparel alone.
Estimates of the elasticity of price with respect to destination income and popula-
tion size for a broad set of manufacturing products are not available as detailed price 
data as the dataset employed by Simonovska (2015) are only available for a handful 
of producers/sectors. In the working paper version we find supporting evidence in 
favor of the author’s findings, which are in line with the predictions of the IA model, 
using retail price data for products with identical characteristics sold in different 
cities around the world. A key limitation of the data is that they are not sufficiently 
detailed so as to be able to argue that price variation across destinations is entirely 
due to pricing to market; in particular, prices may differ across destinations due 
to differences in quality or  non-tradable components as well. We leave for future 
Table 2—Predicted versus Actual Moments
Moments Model Data Source
US exporters, percent all firms 16.27 18–21 Bernard et al. (2003)
Export intensity (percent)   Bernard et al. (2003)
0–10 80.2 66  
10–20 10.5 16  
20–30 4.4 7.7  
30–40 2.0 4.4  
40–50 1.2 2.4  
50–60 0.7 1.5  
60–100 1.0 2.8  
Mark-up mean, percent 19.34 5–40 Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008)
Cost pass-through, mean, percent 0.57 0.36–0.57 De Loecker et al. (2016)
log E, rel. US mean −3.03 −2.70 WDI
SE (2.67) (1.66)
Moments corr (model, data)
log E, 123 countries 0.87   
λ, 123 countries 0.91   
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research to arrive at estimates of the elasticity of price with respect to  per capita 
income and market size across different industries.
Aggregate moments: In this section, we present the model’s fit to aggregate 
moments. The model generates  per capita income levels that are at par with the 
data. In particular, the model falls somewhat short of the mean  per capita income 
level among 123 countries, but it yields a higher variance. Despite the dispersion, 
the model’s predictions line up with the data, as the correlation of the predicted and 
actual  per capita income among 123 countries is 0.87 (in logs). Figure 2 gives a 
visual representation of the model’s fit along the income dimension. While countries 
line up along the  45-degree line, which represents a perfect fit, the model under-
predicts the income levels of the poorest set of countries. Since  per capita incomes 
are chosen so as to match observed trade flows in the market clearing equation, this 
result may be due to the fact that these countries have relatively low import and 
export shares, even conditional on trade barrier levels. This would suggest that these 
countries may simply be plagued by very low productivities.
Figure 3 plots ( non-zero) predicted against actual bilateral trade shares for all 
country pairs. A large cluster of bilateral trade shares can be seen around the origin 
representing the fact that, for the majority of countries, each individual destina-
tion accounts for a tiny fraction of its total sales. On the other hand, large numbers 
that are dispersed around the top right corner mostly capture domestic expendi-
ture shares. Despite the large variation in trade shares, the model can match the 
 cross-section of trade shares quite well due to the flexible specification for trade 
costs in the structural gravity equation.
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Figure 2. Predicted versus Actual  Per Capita Income, 123 Countries
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The margins of trade: In this section, we quantify the model’s predictions about 
the extensive and intensive margin of trade. Recall from (60) that the model pre-
dicts that the elasticity of the extensive margin with respect to destination  per capita 
income equals  κ , while the same elasticity with respect to trade costs equals  − κ . 
Since trade barriers are increasing in distance, our model’s predicted elasticity with 
respect to distance is necessarily negative.
In Table 3, we quantify the elasticity with respect to distance. Since the extensive 
margin in the model is  source-destination specific, we focus on the United States 
as a source country. We regress the predicted extensive margin on destination  per 
capita income, size, and distance from the United States, all in logs. The estimated 
elasticities with respect to the three variables are 2.8, 0.05, and −1.9, respectively, 
and only the first and the last are statistically significant. The coefficients on  per 
capita income and distance are consistent with the findings in Bernard et al. (2007) 
for US data. In particular, the authors document that the elasticity of the number of 
exported products by US exporters with respect to destination GDP is 0.52 and with 
respect to distance is −1.06. While the authors do not decompose the elasticity with 
respect to GDP into the two components:  per capita income and population size, 
our model suggests that the positive slope in the data may be due to the  per capita 
income component.
Along the intensive margin dimension, the model predicts that, controlling for 
aggregate effects, (i) the elasticity of the intensive margin with respect to desti-
nation GDP is 1; (ii) the elasticity of the intensive margin with respect to desti-
nation  per capita income is  − κ , or  − 2.8 given our estimate. Accordingly, in our 
model the intensive margin of trade is increasing in a destination’s overall GDP and 
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Figure 3. Predicted versus Actual Trade Shares, 123 Country Pairs
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 decreasing in the destination’s  per capita income, which can reconcile findings in 
Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) find that 
the intensive margin (defined as average  per firm sales) is increasing in destination 
GDP and either increasing or decreasing in destination  per capita GDP depending 
on the source country analyzed.
Both findings are potentially in line with the existing empirical literature; how-
ever, the literature typically does not distinguish between the effects that  per capita 
income and market size have on the margins of trade. We leave for future research 
to conduct empirical investigations using detailed  firm-level data across different 
industries (characterized by differing magnitudes of fixed costs) to help discern the 
role of these two variables in driving the margins of trade so as to better evaluate the 
performance of different models.
Counterfactual: trade cost reduction between USA and EU.—Given the IA mod-
el’s favorable performance with respect to data, in this section, we use the esti-
mated version to evaluate the welfare gains from a bilateral reduction in trade costs 
between the United States and the European Union.
To quantify the gains from bilateral trade cost reductions, we proceed as follows: 
First, we set the RTA indicator in the  trade-cost function in expression (66) to unity 
for the country pairs that involve the United States and each of the European Union 
members. Second, we use the gravity coefficient estimates, as well as the estimate of 
κ , to compute new bilateral trade barriers. Third, we compute the percent reduction 
on trade barriers for the United States and the European Union. The mean percent 
reduction in trade barriers among these countries is 16 percent, while the trade barri-
ers for  non-EU countries remain unchanged by construction. Finally, to compute the 
welfare gains, we plug the computed change in trade barriers into the system (27), 
using actual trade shares and predicted income, which jointly satisfy the market 
clearing conditions given by the system of equations in (23).
We report the results for all the countries in the left panel of Figure 4. Clearly, the 
European Union and United States gain from the trade cost reduction, but the gains 
are asymmetric. The United States enjoys welfare gains of roughly 0.7 percent and 
Belgium (alongside Luxembourg and the Netherlands) gains by roughly 0.8 percent. 
Ireland is the biggest winner with gains amounting to more than 2 percent. To obtain 
Table 3—Predicted US Extensive Margin of Trade
 (1)
log(pcincome) 2.779
 (0.117)
log(L) 0.046
 (0.073)
log(distance) –1.890
 (0.294)
R2 0.93
Observations 61
Notes: All variables relative to Mexico—the most popular US export destination in terms of 
number of exported products. Standard errors are in parentheses.
52 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2018
a better sense of the results, in the right panel of Figure 4, we zoom in on the coun-
tries with gains below 0.4 percent. The mean gains among the  free-trade agreement 
members are 0.3 percent with a standard deviation of 0.4 percent.  Non-members 
suffer losses which amount to an average of −0.04 percent. Among  non-members, 
USA’s major trade partners Mexico and in particular Canada experience some of the 
largest losses. Overall, however, the gains far exceed the losses in world welfare.
E. Data Appendix
Gravity equation.—The description below follows closely the work of 
Simonovska and Waugh (2014a). To construct trade shares, we used bilateral trade 
flows and production data as follows:
  λ ij  =   Imports ij    ____________________________________   Gross Mfg. Production j −  Exports j +  Imports j  ,
  λ jj  = 1 −  ∑ 
k≠j
I
  λ kj . 
To construct  λ ij , the numerator is the aggregate value of manufactured goods that 
country  j imports from country  i . Bilateral  trade-flow data are for year 2004 from 
the update to Feenstra et al. (2005), who use UN Comtrade data. We obtain all 
bilateral trade flows for our sample of 123 countries at the  four-digit SITC level. We 
then used concordance tables between  four-digit SITC and  three-digit ISIC codes 
provided by the UN and further modified by Muendler (2009).56 We restrict our 
56 The trade data often report bilateral trade flows from two sources. For example, the exports of country A to 
country B can appear in the UN Comtrade data as exports reported by country A or as imports reported by coun-
try B. In this case, we take the report of bilateral trade flows between countries A and B that yields a higher total 
volume of trade across the sum of all SITC  four-digit categories. 
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analysis to manufacturing bilateral trade flows only—namely, those that correspond 
with manufacturing as defined in ISIC Rev.#2.
The denominator is gross manufacturing production minus manufactured exports 
(for only the sample) plus manufactured imports (for only the sample). Gross man-
ufacturing production data are the most serious data constraint we faced. We obtain 
manufacturing production data for 2004 from UNIDO for a large  sub-sample of 
countries. We then imputed gross manufacturing production for countries for which 
data are unavailable as follows. We first obtain 2004 data on manufacturing (MVA) 
and agriculture (AVA) value added, as well as population size (L) and GDP for all 
countries in the sample. We then impute the gross output (GO) to manufacturing 
value added ratio for the missing countries using coefficients resulting from the 
following regression:
  log ( MVA _____GO ) =  β 0 +  β GDP  C GDP +  β L  C L +  β MVA  C MVA +  β AVA  C AVA + ϵ, 
where  β x is a  1 × 3 vector of coefficients corresponding to  C x , an  N × 3 matrix 
which contains  [log (x),  (log (x)) 2 ,  (log (x)) 3 ] for the  sub-sample of  N countries for 
which gross output data are available. Data on geographic barriers (distance, shared 
border, official common language, colonial relationship, common currency and 
RTA) are from Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010). Data on population size for year 
2004 is from the World Development Indicators. Data on  per capita income is from 
Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2013) (Penn World Tables 8.0).
F. Additional Tables
Table 4—Gravity Equation: Estimates
Barrier Parameter estimates Standard error
log distance −1.30 0.03
Border shared 0.75 0.11
Official common language 1.06 0.06
Colonial relationship 1.35 0.08
Common currency −0.08 0.15
RTA 0.48 0.06
Internal trade 1.46 0.22
Observations 15,129
TSS 160,320  
SSR 27,694  
 σ v 2 2.67
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Table 5—Gravity Equation: Estimates
Country  S ˆi SE  ex i SE
Angola −1.03 0.2 −2.62 0.33
Argentina 1.01 0.17 2.63 0.23
Armenia 0.67 0.19 −3.58 0.28
Australia 0.15 0.16 3.78 0.22
Austria 0.23 0.15 3.01 0.22
Azerbaijan −0.17 0.19 −2.52 0.27
Bangladesh 0.79 0.17 0.42 0.23
Belarus 1.12 0.17 −0.66 0.24
Belgium −2.08 0.15 7.55 0.21
Benin −0.56 0.21 −3.93 0.34
Bhutan 0.19 0.28 −5.04 0.41
Bolivia 0.26 0.18 −1.60 0.27
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.72 0.22 −2.84 0.31
Botswana 1.27 0.24 −4.36 0.35
Brazil 1.13 0.15 3.99 0.22
Brunei Darussalam 1.76 0.24 −5.36 0.35
Bulgaria 0.03 0.16 0.92 0.23
Burkina Faso 0.46 0.19 −4.36 0.29
Burundi −1.5 0.19 −3.19 0.32
Cameroon 1.79 0.2 −3.91 0.29
Canada −0.01 0.15 4.06 0.22
Cape Verde −0.44 0.2 −4.83 0.36
Central African Republic 0.6 0.24 −4.89 0.35
Chad 0.66 0.23 −6.61 0.39
Chile 0.29 0.18 1.98 0.25
China 0.89 0.15 6.23 0.22
Colombia 0.23 0.16 0.77 0.23
Comoros −0.8 0.26 −4.74 0.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. −0.66 0.23 −2.31 0.33
Congo, Rep. −0.82 0.2 −1.36 0.29
Côte d’Ivoire 0.96 0.2 −1.60 0.28
Croatia 0.76 0.16 −0.68 0.23
Cyprus −0.83 0.17 0.34 0.23
Czech Republic 0.24 0.15 2.38 0.22
Denmark −0.4 0.16 3.95 0.22
Djibouti −1.85 0.23 −2.72 0.37
Ecuador −0.31 0.17 0.23 0.25
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.28 0.16 0.94 0.22
Equatorial Guinea 0.6 0.23 −4.50 0.38
Estonia −1.72 0.16 1.58 0.23
Ethiopia −0.58 0.2 −2.34 0.29
Fiji −0.47 0.19 −2.32 0.3
Finland 0.96 0.16 2.41 0.22
France 0.33 0.15 5.19 0.21
Gabon −0.94 0.18 −1.81 0.26
Gambia, The −2.07 0.21 −3.01 0.32
Georgia −3.1 0.18 1.37 0.26
Germany 0.21 0.15 5.95 0.21
Ghana −1.07 0.2 −0.10 0.28
Greece 0.45 0.16 1.23 0.22
Guinea −1.53 0.21 −2.62 0.31
Guinea-Bissau −0.47 0.27 −5.60 0.45
Hungary 0.66 0.16 1.39 0.22
Iceland −0.27 0.17 −0.53 0.25
India 1.19 0.15 3.02 0.24
Indonesia 1.16 0.16 3.44 0.22
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.68 0.2 −0.18 0.27
Ireland −3.14 0.15 6.26 0.22
Israel 0.89 0.17 1.10 0.23
Italy 0.26 0.15 5.18 0.22
Japan 1.22 0.15 5.47 0.22
Jordan −0.17 0.17 −0.84 0.24
Country  S ˆi SE  ex i SE
Kazakhstan 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.25
Kenya −0.2 0.16 −0.75 0.22
Korea, Republic of 0.77 0.15 4.91 0.21
Kyrgyz Republic 0.05 0.19 −2.96 0.28
Lao PDR 1.23 0.26 −3.56 0.34
Latvia −0.42 0.18 −0.12 0.25
Lebanon 0.58 0.19 −2.24 0.26
Lesotho 1.64 0.29 −6.35 0.42
Lithuania 0.7 0.2 −0.95 0.28
Macedonia, FYR 0.15 0.18 −2.22 0.26
Malawi −0.17 0.18 −3.50 0.27
Malaysia −1.04 0.15 6.19 0.22
Mali −0.95 0.22 −2.73 0.3
Mauritania −1.97 0.22 −1.78 0.31
Mauritius −1.07 0.17 0.32 0.23
Mexico 0.21 0.15 2.58 0.23
Moldova −0.65 0.18 −1.79 0.28
Morocco −0.06 0.16 0.67 0.22
Mozambique −0.36 0.21 −1.69 0.31
Namibia 1.15 0.22 −3.83 0.31
Nepal 0.42 0.22 −2.83 0.31
New Zealand −0.38 0.16 3.45 0.23
Nigeria −0.66 0.19 −1.44 0.28
Norway 0.14 0.16 2.24 0.22
Oman −0.3 0.18 −0.49 0.25
Pakistan 0.77 0.15 1.61 0.22
Paraguay 0.01 0.19 −0.68 0.27
Peru 0.38 0.17 1.32 0.24
Philippines −0.33 0.17 2.60 0.23
Poland 0.61 0.15 2.20 0.22
Portugal −0.34 0.16 2.99 0.22
Romania 0.33 0.16 1.26 0.22
Russian Federation 1 0.16 2.74 0.22
Rwanda 0.42 0.23 −5.68 0.35
Sierra Leone −0.8 0.27 −4.04 0.39
Saudi Arabia 0.52 0.19 1.05 0.26
Senegal −0.57 0.16 −1.20 0.24
Slovak Republic −0.5 0.16 1.70 0.22
Slovenia 0.77 0.17 0.30 0.23
South Africa 0.51 0.15 3.42 0.22
Spain 0.18 0.15 4.30 0.21
Sri Lanka −0.1 0.17 0.57 0.24
Sudan −0.09 0.2 −3.59 0.3
Swaziland 2.48 0.23 −4.00 0.31
Sweden 0.63 0.15 3.58 0.22
Switzerland 0.09 0.18 3.70 0.26
Syrian Arab Republic −0.35 0.18 −0.90 0.25
Tajikistan 1.09 0.24 −3.14 0.33
Tanzania −0.69 0.21 −2.07 0.3
Thailand 0.55 0.19 4.19 0.26
Togo −1.22 0.17 −1.77 0.26
Tunisia 0.52 0.16 −0.65 0.23
Turkey 0.63 0.16 2.95 0.22
Uganda −0.4 0.17 −2.81 0.25
Ukraine 1.11 0.19 1.47 0.27
United Kingdom −0.21 0.15 5.44 0.21
United States 0.13 0.15 6.73 0.21
Uruguay −0.56 0.19 1.52 0.25
Venezuela, RB 0.61 0.18 −0.39 0.25
Vietnam −0.62 0.2 3.02 0.27
Zambia −3.61 0.17 1.79 0.26
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